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Abstract This case study examines five dimensions of the
2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States: (1) the
devastating effects of the financial crisis on the U.S. econ-
omy, including unparalleled unemployment, massive
declines in gross domestic product (GDP), and the pro-
longed mortgage foreclosure crisis; (2) the multiple causes
of the financial crisis and panic, such as the housing and
bond bubbles, excessive leverage, lax financial regulation,
disgraceful banking practices, and abysmal rating agency
performance; (3) the extraordinary efforts of the Federal
Reserve, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the
Department of the Treasury to stem the financial freefall
triggered by the crisis and resuscitate financial institutions,
(4) the ethical implications of the unprecedented actions by
government institutions to rescue financial institutions and
drag the country back from the brink of global financial
collapse, and the conduct of the various parties contributing
to the financial crisis, such as the shoddy behavior of
mortgage brokers, the massive securitization of mortgages
into overly complex bonds, the excessive leverage of
financial institutions, the disgraceful work of bond rating
firms, the abysmal risk management systems employed by
financial institutions, and the massive operations of the
shadow banking and over-the-counter derivatives markets;
and (5) the major provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law to in
response to the financial crisis and for the purpose of cor-
recting the egregious conduct of major financial institutions.
Keywords Bank Regulatory Agencies  Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDO)  Commercial and investment
banks  Credit default swaps (CDS)  Financial crisis 
Housing bubble  Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
Mortgage brokers  Rating firms  Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP)
Abbreviations
AIG American International Group
CDO Collateralized Debt Obligation
CDS Credit Default Swap
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GSE Government Sponsored Entity
MBS Mortgage-Backed Securities
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OTC Over-the-Counter
OTS Office of Thrift Supervision
SEC Securities Exchange Commission
SIV Structured Investment Vehicle
TARP Troubled Assets Relief Program
Introduction
The purpose of the case study is twofold: (1) to enhance
students’ understanding of the 2007–2009 financial crisis in
the United States, and (2) to provide a convenient tool that
assists faculty members to address the 2007–2009 financial
crisis in their classes and to enhance the student’s under-
standing of ethics.
The case study examines five crucial dimensions of the
2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States: (1) the
devastating effects of the financial crisis on the U.S.
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economy; (2) the multiple causes of the financial crisis and
panic; (3) the extraordinary efforts of government regula-
tory agencies to stem the financial freefall triggered by the
crisis; (4) the ethical implications of the conduct of the
various parties contributing to and ultimately rescuing the
country from the financial crisis, and (5) the major provi-
sions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act signed into law to in response to the
financial crisis.
The ‘‘Disastrous Effects of the 2007–2009 Financial
Crisis’’ section of the case will catalog the deleterious
effects of the financial crisis including unparalleled
unemployment, massive declines in gross domestic product
(GDP), and the prolonged mortgage foreclosure crisis.
The ‘‘Causes of the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis’’ section
will explore the main causes of the financial crisis, such as the
housing and bond bubbles, excessive leverage, lax financial
regulation, disgraceful banking practices, and abysmal rating
agency performance, and thereby identify the actions of the
major participants, such as mortgage brokers, subprime
mortgage lenders, financial institutions, bond rating firms, and
regulatory agencies, which contributed to the financial crisis.
The ‘‘Unprecedented Rescue Efforts’’ section will
examine the extraordinary efforts of the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Department of
the Treasury to rescue and resuscitate financial institutions.
These efforts include massive loans, forced acquisitions,
capital infusions, tainted asset purchases, instantaneous
conversion of investment banks into commercial banks,
receiverships, and TARP funds. The rescued firms include
financial giants deemed ‘‘too big to fail,’’ such as Bear
Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AIG, Merrill Lynch,
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Washington Mutual,
Wachovia, Citigroup, Bank of America, General Motors,
and Chrysler and their finance companies.
The ‘‘Major Ethical Issues’’ section will outline the major
ethical questions that rise from the activities of the players
contributing to the financial crisis and the government insti-
tutions implementing unprecedented rescue strategies to drag
the financial crisis back from the brink of total global collapse.
These activities include the shoddy conduct of mortgage
brokers in pushing clients into dodgy subprime loans, the
massive securitization of mortgages and other loans into
overly complex bond investments acquired by financial firms
around the globe, the failure of regulatory agencies to correct
the slapdash lending practices and excessive leverage of
financial institutions, the disgracefulwork ofbond ratingfirms
in evaluating the complex, multi-tranched investments
churned out by the banks, the abysmal risk management
system employed by AIG, and the massive operations of the
shadow banking and over-the-counter derivatives markets.
The ‘‘Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act’’ section will describe the major provisions
of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act signed into law in response to the financial
crisis and for the purpose of correcting the egregious
conduct of major financial institutions that caused the
financial crisis.
Disastrous Effects of the 2007–2009 Financial
Crisis
The 2007–2009 financial crisis had a devastating effect on
the U.S. economy and plunged the country into a long and
deep recession officially beginning in December 2007 and
ending in June 2009 (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
[‘‘FCI Report’’] 2011, pp. 390–391). The disastrous effects
included serious and long-lasting unemployment and huge
declines in gross domestic product. A sharp rise in jobless-
ness, which began in early 2008 and lasted to late 2009, saw
unemployment remain at 7.8 % or higher for 46 consecutive
months (Blinder 2013, pp. 10–11). On average, the economy
shed 46,000 jobs per month in the first quarter of 2008, a
scary 651,000 over the last quarter, and horrifying 780,000 in
the first quarter of 2009 (p. 11). Just under 8.8 million jobs
were lost during a period when the economy should have
added about 3.1 million jobs to accommodate ordinary labor
force growth (FCI Report 2011, p. 390). While employment
barely crawled up in 2010 and 2011, it reached only May
2005 levels, marking a zero net job growth over a period of
more than 7 years (Blinder 2013, pp. 11–12). Significantly,
the unemployment period endured far longer. During the
years 1948–2007, the long-term unemployed—those who
were jobless for more than 6 months—constituted fewer
than 13 % of the unemployed. By April 2010, the long-term
unemployed peaked above an alarming 45 % (pp. 12–13).1
Further, during 2008 and the first half of 2009, the real
decline in GDP was 4.7 %, the worst decline since the
1930s. The decline occurred in five out of six quarters and
in four quarters in a row (p. 14).2 In contrast, during the
period 1947–2008, declines of real GDP occurred for two
consecutive quarters only nine times, three consecutive
quarters only two times, and never fell for four consecutive
quarters (p. 13). ‘‘All in all, it is hard to escape the con-
clusion that the 2008–2009 period was the worst by far in
1 The underemployment rate (unemployed workers looking for jobs,
part-time workers looking for full-time jobs; and those who need jobs
but are too discouraged to search) increased from 8.8 % in December
2007 to 13.7 % in December 2008, reaching 17.4 % in October 2009,
the highest level since calculations for that category were first made in
1994. When the recession ended in June 2009, there were 26.2 million
underemployed (FCI Report 2011, pp. 390–391).
2 ‘‘Since trend growth would have been at least 3.5 % over that period,
we probably lost over 8 % of GDP, relative to trend. That’s the
equivalent of every American losing 8 % of his or her income, or, more
realistically, 10 %of the population losing 80 %’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 14).
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70 years, both in terms of job loss and GDP decline (p.
14).’’ Significantly, the speed of recovery from the
2007–2009 recession has been abnormally slow. Usually,
strong economic growth spurts follow steep declines in
GDP. In the two preceding ‘‘great recessions’’ in
1973–1974 and 1980–1982, for example, the economy
grew 6.2 % and 5.6 % in the following year. By that
measure, a growth rate of approximately 7 % should have
followed the 2007–2009 recession. Instead, the economy
managed to grow by only 2.5 %, providing a ‘‘double
whammy: a sharp recession followed by a weak recovery
(p. 13).’’
The sharp rise in unemployment and decline in GDP trig-
gered other woes. From 2007 to the first quarter of 2009,
households lost $17 trillion in net worth, home prices dropped
32 % from their peak in 2006 to their low point in 2009, and
homeownership shrank from its peak of 69.2 % in 2004 to
66.9 % in the fall of 2010 (FCIReport 2011, pp. 391–392). The
stockmarket declined andassets in retirement accounts such as
401(k) lost $2.8 trillion, about one third of their value, between
September 2007 and December 2008. Consumer spending,
which normally makes up two-thirds of GDP fell at an annual
rate of roughly 3.5 % in the second half of 2008 and fell again
in the first half of 2009 (p. 394). Business financing dried up
and sharp increases in the U.S. business bankruptcies ensued.
In 2006, 20,000 U.S. companies filed for bankruptcy; in 2009,
that figure tripled to nearly 61,000 (p. 394). Commercial real
estate also took a pounding. In the fall 2010, commercial
vacancies rose sharply and 20 % of all office space was
unoccupied (p. 397). Almost half of commercial real estate
loans were ‘‘underwater’’ (the mortgage debt exceeded the
value of the property) as of February 2010 (p. 398). These
economic declines, in turn, forced state and local governments
to struggle with sharp revenue declines at the same time peo-
ple—who lost their jobs, went into bankruptcy, and faced
foreclosure—demanded more services, including Medicaid,
unemployment compensation, and welfare (p. 398).
The financial crisis also generated the mortgage foreclo-
sure crisis. After the housing bubble burst, about fourmillion
families lost their homes to foreclosure and another four and
one half million families slipped into the foreclosure process
or were seriously behind on their mortgage payments (p.
402). Prior to 2007, the mortgage foreclosure rate was his-
torically less than 1 %. Following the housing market col-
lapse, mortgage foreclosures increased dramatically. In
2009, 2.2 % or one out of 45 houses, faced at least one
foreclosure filing. There are two major events which typi-
cally trigger mortgage defaults: failure to make monthly
payments and the decline in the home’s value. In the fall of
2010, one in every eleven outstanding residential mortgage
loans was at least one payment past due and facing foreclo-
sure, and about 10.8 million households, or 22.5 % of those
with mortgages, owed more on their mortgages than the
market value of their home (pp. 402–403). Unfortunately,
federal and state efforts to stem foreclosures—such as the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and state
mortgage modification and foreclosure assistance pro-
grams—have generally been woefully ineffective (p. 405).3
Causes of the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis
Professor Alan S. Blinder identifies seven ‘‘key weak-
nesses’’ that contributed significantly to the 2007–2009
financial crisis and provides a useful framework to identify
the major ethical questions presented by the financial crisis:
1. Inflated asset prices, especially of houses (the housing
bubble) but also of certain securities (the bond bubble);
2. Excessive leverage (heavy borrowing) throughout the
financial system and the economy;
3. Lax financial regulation, both in terms of what the law
left unregulated and how poorly the various regulators
performed their duties;
4. Disgraceful banking practices in subprime and other
mortgage lending;
5. The crazy-quilt of unregulated securities and deriva-
tives that were built on these bad mortgages;
6. The abysmal performance of the statistical rating
agencies, which helped the crazy-quilt get stitched
together; and
7. The perverse compensation systems in many financial
institutions that created powerful incentives to go for
broke (Blinder 2013, pp. 27–28).4
Housing and Bond Bubbles
A bubble is a large, long-lasting deviation of the price of
some asset from its fundamental value (p. 29). It is devil-
ishly difficult to identify a bubble as it occurs, because it is
usually accompanied with favorable fundamentals, making
it hard to determine what portion of the asset value increase
is due to the bubble or to the improved fundamentals (p.
31).5 More likely the bubble’s existence is confirmed by
3 Complicating factors such as the conflicting interests of financial
institutions holding second mortgages and investors in different
tranches of mortgage-backed securities have made mortgage modi-
fication efforts extremely difficult (FCI Report 2011, p. 406).
4 See also Friedman (2011) and Arbogast (2013).
5 The FCI Report (2011) catalogs multiple warnings of the housing
bubble (pp. 7–18). Paul Krugman’s New York Times columns in 2001
and 2002 warned of a housing bubble. Economist Dean Baker
concluded in a 2002 paper that ‘‘the only plausible explanation for the
sudden surge in home prices is the existence of a housing bubble.’’ By
2003, magazines such as the Economist, Barron’s, and Money
contained articles about a possible housing bubble. (Blinder 2013,
p. 33)
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hindsight when it bursts. Such was the case with the
spectacular 2000–2009 housing bubble ‘‘of historic pro-
portions (p. 35).’’ The history of relative house prices (i.e.,
compared to the prices of other things consumers buy)
from 1890 to 1997 barely changed (p. 32).6 Suddenly,
beginning in 1997, things altered radically. According to
the Case–Schiller index, real house prices rocketed by
85 % between 1997 and 2006 (including an increase of
about 72 % from January 2000 to January 2006) and then
plummeted from 2006 to 2012 (pp. 32–33).7 Likewise,
after soaring from a low of around 800,000 units per year in
January 1991 to a peak of almost 2.3 million units per year
in January 2006, housing starts went bust in 2006, bot-
toming out at under 500,000 units per year in April 2009
(p. 35).
Several factors account for the run-up in house prices. A
‘‘gold rush’’ mentality overtook the country (FCI Report
2011, p. 6), and, following the tech stock bubble burst in
2000, investors ‘‘were looking for a safer, stabler place to
invest their money,’’ and, by using leverage, ‘‘really could
earn a high real return by investing in housing (Blinder
2013, p. 38).’’ Attempting to boost the economy, the
Federal Reserve held short-term interest rates extraordi-
narily low in 2003 and 2004, leading to historically low
interest rates on home mortgages. Banks and other lenders
practically tossed money at prospective new homeowners
and existing homeowners who wished to refinance at lower
rates (p. 38). Rising house prices facilitated home refi-
nancing, which boomed from $469 billion in 2000 to $2.8
trillion in 2003 (FCI Report 2011, p. 5). Lending institu-
tions became enamored with adjustable-rate mortgages,
which began to replace the standard 30-year, fixed rate,
20 % down, prime mortgage loan, and provided the bor-
rower with temptingly low interest rates during the first few
years of the mortgage and the lender with protection should
interest rates rise over the life of the mortgage (p. 104).8
Moreover, and as will be discussed more fully below,
lenders learned that hefty profits can be earned in subprime
mortgage loans, and soon began to relax underwriting
standards and offered an array of alternative, subprime
mortgages permitting homeowners and investors to acquire
ever more expensive houses (pp. 105–106). Meanwhile, as
will also be discussed below, mortgage securitization per-
mitted the lender to sell mortgage loans to investment
companies, which in turn pooled them into mortgage-
backed securities they sold to other investors. The securi-
tization of mortgages moved the mortgage loan off the
books of the lender and freed capital to make additional
mortgage loans (pp. 42–43).
According to Blinder (2013), a bond bubble accompanied
the housing bubble (pp. 40–41). Unlike the housing bubble, in
which the misperception was the conviction the value of
houseswould increase forever, themistaken belief in the bond
bubble was that the historic low rate of defaults on mortgages
during the period 1991–2004 would continue evermore (pp.
41–42).9 By understating the risk of mortgage default,
investors vastly overstated the value of the mortgage-backed
securities (p. 54). Becausemortgage-backed bonds provided a
higher return than U.S. Treasury bonds with a perceived
negligible increase in risk, investors flocked to mortgage-
backed securities (and attempted to magnify the return by
leveraging the investment, worsening the result when the
bottom fell out) producing a ‘‘huge bond bubble’’ (p. 54).
Excessive Leverage
The key ingredient to the 2007–2009 financial crisis was
excessive leverage throughout the entire financial system.
Leverage began with home owners. Household debt rose
from 80 % of disposable personal income in 1993 to
almost 130 % by mid-2006, and more than three-quarters
of the increase was mortgage debt (FCI Report 2011,
pp. 83–84).10 The average mortgage debt per household
rose from $91,500 in 2001 to $149,500 in 2007. Overall
mortgage indebtedness in the U.S. climbed from $5.3
trillion in 2001 to $10.5 trillion in 2007, and the average
mortgage debt of the American household rose almost as
much in the 6 years from 2001 to 2007 as it had over the
course of the country’s more than 200-year history (p. 7).
Prime mortgages, which require at least a 20 % down
payment, provide homeowners with a leverage ratio of 5 to
1. Subprime mortgages, requiring 5 % down payment or
6 ‘‘[T]he average annual relative price increase from 1890 to 1997
was just 0.09 of 1 %.’’ Nonetheless, ‘‘while the data exhibit no long
run trend for over a century, there were some very conspicuous ups
and downs. For example, real house prices rose almost 60 % from
1942 to 1947 and, more recently, jumped over 20 % from 1964 to
1989.’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 33)
7 The FCI Report (2011) states that ‘‘[n]ationally, housing prices
jumped 152 % between 1997 and their peak in 2006, more than in any
decade since at least 1920,’’ citing interviews with Jim Callahan,
former Salomon Brothers trader and CEO of Pent Alpha, and Lewis
Ranieri, former vice chairman of Solomon Brothers (p. 156 and 565).
This reported increase in prices is presumably not adjusted for
inflation.
8 Subprime mortgages rose from 8 % of mortgage originations in
2003 to 20 % in 2005. Adjustable-rate mortgages ‘‘gave home buyers
even lower initial payments or made a larger home more affordable
provided interest rates did not rise. In 2001, 4 % of prime borrowers
with new mortgages chose ARMs; in 2003, 10 % did. In 2004, the
proportion rose to 21 %. Among subprime borrowers, already heavy
Footnote 8 continued
users of ARMS, it rose from around 60 to 76 %.’’ (FCI Report 2011,
p. 85)
9 During the period 1991–2004, ‘‘[a]ctual defaults… were, in a word,
negligible’’ (Blinder 2013, pp. 41–42).
10 Household debt (mortgage plus personal) rose from about 100 %
of GDP to about 140 % from 2000 to 2008 (Blinder 2013, p. 49).
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less, became increasingly common, and raised the leverage
ratio of the borrower to 20 to 1 or higher (Blinder 2013,
p. 47). Even the slightest loss put the subprime borrower
under water (p. 47).
Banks were also dangerously overleveraged. They bor-
rowed heavily in the commercial paper and short-term
‘‘repo’’ market. The former were unsecured, short-term
loans that, until the crisis, were invariably renewed by the
lender. The latter were agreements to sell securities (ini-
tially Treasury bonds and later mortgage-backed securities
and collateralized debt obligations) to the lender and then
repurchase them at a slightly higher price. Repo loans too
were invariably renewed by the lender. Because these were
generally private transactions, there was little transparency
in either market, and the extent to which the banks
expanded their leverage through the commercial paper and
repo markets was generally unknown by other banks. That
would become a major issue as the financial crisis unfol-
ded, because lenders began to question the value of the
assets the borrower posted as collateral and disclosed on
the balance sheet (FCI Report 2011, p. 228).
Another vehicle banks used to achieve higher leverage
was off-balance-sheet entities, such as structured invest-
ment vehicles (SIV) (Blinder 2013, p. 50).11 Banks sold
substantial portions of their loans to the SIV, which bor-
rowed money in the commercial paper market to pay for
the loans making the SIV highly leveraged. The bank, in
turn, loaned the money it received from the SIV, convert-
ing the cash into loans without affecting the amount of its
reported assets. If the bank’s deposits stay substantially the
same, the bank did not affect its leverage. Moreover, as
long as the SIV remained solvent, its assets and liabilities
did not have to be reported in the bank’s financial state-
ments and the highly leveraged position of the SIV
remained hidden. When the value of the loans in the SIV
sour—as they did with gusto in the financial crisis—the
thin layer of equity in the SIV is wiped out and the losses
are attributable to the bank (pp. 50–53).
Banks’ efforts to attain higher leverage succeeded
magnificently:
From 2000 to 2007, large banks and thrifts generally
had $16 to $22 in assets for each dollar of capital, for
leverage ratios between 16:1 and 22:1. For some
banks, leverage remained roughly constant. J.P.
Morgan’s reported leverage was between 20:1 and
22:1. Wells Fargo’s generally ranged between 16:1
and 17:1. Other banks upped their leverage. Bank of
America’s rose from 18:1 in 2000 to 27:1 in 2007.
Citigroup’s increased from 18:1 to 22:1, then shot up
to 32:1 by the end of 2007, when Citi brought off-
balance assets onto the balance sheet. More than the
other banks, Citigroup held assets off its balance
sheet, in part to hold down capital requirements. In
2007, even after bringing $80 billion worth of assets
on balance sheet, substantial assets remained off. If
those had been included, leverage in 2007 would
have been 48:1, or about 53 % higher. In comparison,
at Wells Fargo and Bank of America, including off-
balance sheet assets would have raised the 2007
leverage ratios 17 % and 28 %, respectively (FCI
Report 2011, p. 65).
Large investment banks were even more successful in
achieving significant leverage. Investment banks were not
subject to the same capital requirements as commercial and
retail banks. Rather, investment banks were permitted to
rely on their internal risk models in determining capital
requirements. This enabled them to achieve higher lever-
age. Goldman Sachs’ ‘‘leverage increased from 17:1 in
2000 to 32:1 in 2007. Morgan Stanley and Lehman
increased about 67 % and 22 % respectively, and both
reached 40:1 by the end of 2007 (FCI Report 2011, p. 65).’’
In order to hide their high leverage, ‘‘several investment
banks artificially lowered leverage ratios by selling assets
right before the reporting period and subsequently buying
them back (p. 65).’’
Reaching a 40:1 leveragemeans that the investment bank’s
capital constituted a mere 2.5 % of its assets; the remaining
97.5 % is borrowed, a great deal of which is short-term, much
11 Banks were permitted to exclude both the assets transferred to the
SIV and the loans incurred by the SIV from the banks’ balance sheets
under accounting principles in place at the time of the crisis:
The logic of the off-balance sheet treatment of such things as
structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, which banks created in
order to get assets off their books, was that the bank did not
control them, and so did not have to show the SIV assets, and
liabilities, on its own books. That fiction evaporated early in
the financial crisis. Some SIVs were among the first structures
to fail, when they could not roll over loans to finance assets that
had lost value. The banks chose to, or had to, rescue the SIVs.
Maybe they did so to guard their reputations, or maybe they
feared they would have been vulnerable to fraud allegations
from those who lent to the leaking SIVs. In either case, it
turned out there was a black hole that the regulatory rules had
ignored in assessing how much capital the banks needed to
hold. (Blinder 2013, p. 50)
Norris (1990). That accounting rule was subsequently changed by
amendments to FASB No. 2013-08, Amendments to the Scope,
Measurement and Disclosure Requirements, Financial Services-
Investment Companies (Topic 946), issued in June 2013. FASB No.
2013-08 amended the definition of investment companies to include
the bank and SIVs and requires the disclosure by the bank of the fair
market value of investments held by the SIV. KPMG (2013, at 2),
accessed at http://www.kpmginstitutes.com/financial-reporting-net
work/insights/2013/pdf/executive-accounting-investment-companies.
pdf?utm_source=page&utm_medium=/financial-reporting-network/
insights/2013/eau-new-criteria-investment-company-changes.aspx&
utm_campaign=download.
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of it overnight (Blinder 2013, pp. 52–53).12 Because interest
rates on overnight, collateralized repo loans13 were cheaper
than interest rates on bonds (a source of funding that is guar-
anteed for the life of the bond), banks found it more attractive
to use the former as a source of capital. The problemwith that
strategy is that the bank must return to the capital markets
everyday to renew its loan, and, should events raise questions
about the bank’s creditworthiness, the bank is in major trou-
ble. If the bank is unable to roll over its short-term borrowing,
the modern version of the run on the bank ensues (p. 53).14
Synthetic leverage in the form of derivatives augmented
the leverage in the financial system. ‘‘Derivatives are financial
contracts whose prices are determined by, or ‘derived’ from,
the value of some underlying asset, rate, index, or event (FCI
Report 2011, pp. 45–46).’’15 Coming in many forms, deriva-
tives are used to hedge business risk or speculate on changes in
such things as prices or interest rates. Two common deriva-
tives are exchange-traded futures and options and over-the-
counter credit default swaps (p. 46). Credit default swaps are
agreements between a buyer and a seller in which the seller
agrees to pay a debt obligation, such as a bond or a loan, if
there is a default, and the buyer agrees to pay premiums to the
seller for the debt protection (p. 50).16 The futures and options
transactions are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (p. 46); the credit default swap transactions were
decidedly not regulated at the time of the financial crisis (p.
48).17 Left to its own devices, the over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives market boomed. At the end of 2000, the notational
amount of OTC derivatives outstanding globally was $95.2
trillion and the gross market value was $3.2 trillion. In June
2008, when the market peaked, outstanding OTC derivatives
increased more than sevenfold to a notational amount of
$672.6 trillion and the gross market value was $20.3 trillion
(FCI Report 2011, p. 48).18 Significantly, derivatives nor-
mally are ‘‘zero-sum gambles (Blinder 2013, p. 62),’’ akin to
dividing the pot in a game of poker: some players win and
some players lose, but those not involved in the poker game
are unaffected. The drastically high risks they imposed on the
parties to the derivatives, however, were sufficient to trigger
the financial crisis.
By acquiring derivatives, financial institutions achieved
two major leverage advantages: derivatives could be used
to hedge against risks thereby lowering the firm’s ‘‘value at
risk,’’ and derivatives lowered the amount of capital banks
were required to hold (FCI Report 2011, p. 49).19 OTC
derivatives also permitted derivatives traders—including
large banks and investment banks—to increase their
leverage. Because the derivative mimics the returns
received by someone actually owning the security, traders
could achieve the same profit (or incur the same loss)
without buying the security. The trader simply purchased
the swap at a fraction of the actual security owner’s
financial outlay and often with no collateral at all.
The principal difficulty with the ‘‘newfangled’’ deriva-
tives that contributed significantly to the financial crisis is
that they were extremely complicated and poorly under-
stood, and created synthetic leverage in spectacular
amounts (p. 50).20 When the bubble in mortgage-backed
12 ‘‘For example, Bear Stearns’ year-end balance sheet listed only
16 % of its liabilities as long-term borrowings. Its short-term
borrowings were more than eight times its equity. Its reported
leverage, by the way was 29 to 1’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 53).
13 A repurchase agreement, or repo, is a sale of securities for cash
with a commitment to repurchase them at a specified price at a future
date. Because the securities forming the basis of the agreement act as
collateral for the loan, the repurchase agreement by itself is simply a
collateralized loan.
14 ‘‘Such runs more or less killed both Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers in 2008, and almost killed Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley
and Goldman Sachs. All five were playing with fire’’ (Blinder 2013,
p. 53).
15 ‘‘’Derivative’ is a generic term for any security or contract whose
value is derived from that of some underlying natural security, such as
a stock or a bond. Instead of owning the asset, and either profiting or
losing as its price rises or falls, a derivative is a bet on some aspect of
its behavior’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 61).
16 When credit default swaps were packaged into synthetic CDOs,
risk was amplified, because the buyer of the CDO was also exposed to
subprime mortgages.
17 ‘‘In December 2000… Congress passed and President Clinton
signed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA),
which in essence deregulated the OTC derivatives market and
eliminated oversight by both the [Consumer Futures Trading Com-
mission] and the [Securities Exchange Commission]. The law also
preempted application of state laws on gaming and on bucket shops
(illegal brokerage operations) that otherwise could have made OTC
derivatives transactions illegal. The CFMA effectively shielded OTC
derivatives from virtually all regulation or oversight’’ (FCI Report
Footnote 17 continued
2011, p. 48). The enactment of CFMA marks another successful
lobbying effort by the financial industry to remove government
restrictions on financial activities: repealing limits on interest rates
banks and thrifts could pay on deposits in 1980; broadening types of
loans banks and thrifts could make, such as interest only, balloon
payment, and adjustable rate in 1982; removing restrictions on
underwriting and derivatives trading in 1987; permitting bank holding
companies to acquire banks in every state in 1994; and repealing any
remaining restrictions of Glass–Steagall through the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act in 1999.
18 Because the reported notational value refers to the value of the
underlying securities, not the derivative, it may ‘‘sound scarily
large—vastly larger than the total world wealth, for example.’’ If the
derivative become worthless, its owner would lose the market value,
not the notational value (Blinder 2013, p. 62).
19 The 1988 Basel International Capital Accords (‘‘Basel I’’) made
capital requirements for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities
less than for all other assets except those explicitly backed by the U.S.
Government. Basel I also permitted banks which hedged their credit
or market risks using derivatives to hold less capital against their
exposures from trading and other activities (FCI Report 2011, p. 49).
20 This problem was exacerbated, because much of the derivative’s
risk was concentrated in a handful of the very largest banks,
investment banks, and AIG Financial Products, a unit of AIG, which
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securities burst, a much larger bubble in leveraged bets
burst at the same time, creating one huge mess (Blinder
2013, p. 55).21
Reluctant Regulators
At the time of the financial crisis, the banking industry was
subject to four federal banking regulators charged with
‘‘ensuring the safe and sound operation of banks and other
financial institutions’’: the Federal Reserve, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) (p. 57).22 Under the regulators’
‘‘unwatchful’’ eyes, banks proliferated their SIVs,
approved hundreds of billions of dollars in shamefully bad
subprime mortgages (many designed to default) (Blinder
2013, p. 70), and invested vast sums of money in dicey
assets ‘‘they portrayed as, and maybe even believed were,
safe (p. 57).’’ That the banking regulators could have
‘‘slammed the door on some of the more outrageous
underwriting practices, but didn’t’’ is perhaps the greatest
tragedy of the financial crisis (p. 58).23 Risky subprime
lending by banks expanded significantly in plain view.
Subprime mortgages were only 7 % of mortgages granted
in 2001. By 2005, subprime lending grew to 20 % of all
new mortgages, and total outstanding subprime mortgage
balances soared to about $1.25 trillion. Unfortunately, the
banking regulators seemed not to notice despite warnings
that matters were getting out of hand (p. 58).24 Whether it
was the free-market ideology of banking regulatory offi-
cials or perceived political pressure to drive up home-
ownership among relatively low-income families in the
Clinton and Bush administrations, the regulators looked the
other way. Indeed, the banking regulators may not actually
have seen ‘‘the complete sorry picture for what it was,’’
because a growing source of the ‘‘dodgy’’ mortgages was
non-bank lenders operating beyond the purview of the
federal regulatory system ‘‘with no adult supervision at all’’
(p. 59).25
The non-bank mortgage lenders were part of what is
sometimes called the shadow banking system, a ‘‘complex
latticework of financial institutions and capital markets’’
heavily involved in borrowing and lending (p. 59).26 The
Footnote 20 continued
dominated dealings in OTC derivatives. ‘‘Among U.S. bank holding
companies, 97 % of the notional amount of OTC derivatives, millions
of contracts, were traded by just five large institutions (in 2008,
J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Wachovia, and
HSBC)—many of the same firms that would find themselves in
trouble during the financial crisis. The country’s five largest invest-
ment banks were also among the world’s largest OTC derivatives
dealers’’ (FCI Report 2011, p. 50).
21 The over-the-counter derivatives market came to a ‘‘grinding halt’’
in the Fall of 2008, substantially limiting the ability of institutions to
enter or unwind their contracts or to hedge business risks at a time
when risk management was most crucially needed (FCI Report 2011,
p. 365).
22 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was equally
unvigilant in regulating the issuance of the mortgage-backed secu-
rities and collateralized debt obligations. By the time the financial
crisis hit, investors held more than $2 trillion of non-GSE mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and close to $700 billion of collateralized
debt obligations (CDO) that held mortgage-backed securities, all of
which were issued with practically no SEC oversight. The MBS were
issued through ‘‘shelf registration’’ (a shell registration statement to
which by a supplemental prospectus was added). The SEC did not
review the supplemental prospectus. If it had, it would have learned
that the issuer disclaimed its obligation to comply with Regulation
AB which required disclosure of credit-granting or underwriting
criteria used in assembling the pooled loans. The CDOs were issued
through Rule 144A to qualified institutional buyers. This provision
permits the sale of the securities without registration (FCI Report
2011, pp. 169–170).
23 The 1994 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)
directed the Federal Reserve to more broadly ‘‘prohibit acts or
practices in connection with the [mortgage loans that the Federal
Reserve] finds unfair, deceptive or designed to evade the provisions of
the [act].’’ Despite this opportunity, the Federal Reserve consistently
Footnote 23 continued
eschewed its responsibilities to intercede in mortgage loans (FCI
Report 2011, pp. 76–77).
24 ‘‘Alert journalists, for example, were writing about risky lending
practices in the subprime mortgage sector as early as 2004. It was an
open secret…. [T]he late governor Edward ‘‘Ned’’ Gramlich was
warning Alan Greenspan that things were getting out of hand as early
as 2000. And Sheila Bair, who was then a Bush Treasure official, was
sounding alarms there’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 58).
25 ‘‘[O]nly one of the top ten subprime mortgage originators in 2005
was a regulated commercial bank (Wells Fargo). By 2007 more than
half of all subprime loans were being originated by mortgage brokers
rather than by banks. Indeed, Gramlich estimated that only 10 % of
subprime loans granted in 2005 came from regularly supervised banks
and thrifts’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 59).
26 The term ‘‘shadow banking’’ refers to the lack of transparency in
transactions by financial institutions outside the purview of govern-
ment regulators. The term was originally coined in 2007 by economist
Paul McCulley to refer to non-bank financial transactions outside of
the scope of government regulation in which short-term funds were
borrowed to invest in longer-term assets. The definition was expanded
to encompass lending transactions by all entities outside the regulated
banking system in which investors lend money to borrowers who
invest the funds in assets with longer-term maturities. When investors
became concerned about the worth of those longer-term assets and
refrained from renewing the loans or withdrew their funds, the
shadow bank lenders were forced to sell their assets into falling
markets and to reduce the value of similar assets on their books,
creating further fears about their financial health. As the financial
crisis peaked, so many investors withdrew or would not roll over their
funds, that many financial institutions, banks and non-banks,
encountered serious financial difficulty. Those difficulties affected
commercial banks, because some commercial banks controlled
shadow banks and because the withdrawal of shadow banks from
other markets affected the commercial markets in which banks
borrowed money. Because these transactions were private party
transactions outside the realm of government regulation, there was
little transparency and no one knew who owed money to whom or
how much was owed, causing banks to cease trusting and lending to
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players in the shadow banking system included: Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, two government sponsored entities
(GSE) charged with purchasing and pooling prime mort-
gages and selling them to financial institutions; private
label securitizers (non-GSE assemblers of debt-backed
securities); investment banks (which were often securitiz-
ers as well); bank-owned SIVs; non-bank finance compa-
nies; hedge funds; private equity funds; asset managers;
and mutual, pension and other investment funds (pp.
59–60). The shadow banking system provided rich soil for
the burgeoning growth of derivatives, which despite sev-
eral instances of highly publicized ‘‘accidents’’ were set
free from any government regulation by the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (pp. 60, 62–63).27
One particular type of derivative—the credit default
swap (CDS)—emerged in the year 2000 and went on to
play a major role in the financial crisis. The CDS is like an
insurance policy. The purchaser of a CDS pays periodic
fees to the seller of the CDS over the life of the CDS in
return for the seller’s guarantee to pay an identified debt
(e.g., a bond or loan obligation). If a default occurs on the
underlying debt, the seller is obligated to pay the buyer the
face value of the debt (FCI Report 2011, p. 50 and Blinder
2013, p. 66). The CDS plays a crucial role in permitting
investors to hedge against non-payment. For example, an
investor who is fearful the debtor on a bond will not be able
to pay can purchase a CDS on the bond and have assurance
the face value will be paid when due. If the debtor pays the
bond when due, the CDS expires and the premiums paid by
the purchaser for the CDS reduce the profit realized on the
bond. If the debtor fails to pay the bond when due, the
seller of the CDS pays the face value to the buyer of the
CDS, much like an insurance policy covers insured losses.
Like an insurance company, the seller of the CDS incurs a
large loss, but hopefully one that occurs only rarely
(Blinder 2013, p. 66). In short order, however, the CDS
morphed into the ‘‘naked’’ CDS in which purchasers and
sellers of CDS had no interest in the underlying security.
They simply placed a bet with each other on whether or not
a default event will take place. In this scenario, risk is
created not extinguished (p. 66).
The CDS transaction played a large role in the financial
crisis, because it enhanced leverage (a small premium can
produce a significant payout), ceased to be a zero-sum
game when the sellers were unable to pay the guaranteed
debt (witness the bailout of AIG to be discussed later in this
case study), and provided huge profit margins for dealers
willing to issue customized derivatives, driving banks into
‘‘feeding frenzies to expand volume’’ (p. 67). As the
financial crisis unfolded, the lack of transparency in the
derivatives markets fomented unbridled fear of the seller’s
default and shut the derivatives markets down, perhaps the
biggest boom-bust story in the crisis, magnifying the losses
stemming from subprime mortgage defaults from what
otherwise should have been a controllable event into a
financial catastrophe (p. 67).28 The financial system could
not withstand this wretched stew: unwatchful regulators,
unbridled mortgage lending standards, unregulated shadow
banking, derivatives exempt from regulation, and subprime
mortgages (and the securities into which they were placed)
going bad (p. 68).
Shameful Subprime Mortgage Lending Practices
In 1994 subprime mortgage originations were around $35
billion and about 5 % of total originations. By 2005, sub-
prime mortgage originations reached $625 billion and
about 20 % of total originations (p. 70). These loans took
multiple forms, including interest only (the borrower pays
interest only for a stated period and a final principal pay-
ment in one large installment at the end of the term), bal-
loon mortgages (the borrower pays lower, regular
payments for a specific term and then must pay the
remaining balance in higher payments within a relatively
short time) (FCI Report 2011, p. 34),29 and ‘‘pick-a-pay’’
loan (the borrower decides to make the contractual pay-
ment, pay only the interest, or pay less than the interest
due, in which case the interest not paid is added to the
principal) (Blinder 2013, p. 71). Subprime loans also
included ‘‘no-doc’’ and ‘‘low-doc’’ mortgages (loans pro-
cessed with little or no documentation of income or ability
Footnote 26 continued
other banks. In short, the term shadow banking refers to the lack of
disclosure and information. (Kodres 2013). It is in this sense that
Professor Binder describes the shadow banking system (Blinder 2013,
pp. 59–63), and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission explains its
role in the financial Crisis (FCI Report 2011, pp. 27–37). And it is this
sense that the term is used in the case study.
27 The accidents include the bankruptcy of Orange County, Califor-
nia which found itself on the wrong side of a derivative deal with
Merrill Lynch; highly publicized litigation between Proctor &
Gamble and Bankers Trust which triggered the release of highly
damning audiotapes; the escapades of Nick Leeson, a rogue trader
whose Singapore trades broke Barings, Britain’s oldest investment
bank; and the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge
fund, which set off a worldwide financial crisis (Blinder 2013, pp. 60,
62–63).
28 The notational value of outstanding CDS was $919 billion in 2001.
By the end of 2007, the notational value exceeded $62 trillion. In
2008, an estimated 80 % of outstanding CDS were naked (Blinder
2013, p. 67).
29 Investopedia.com, accessed at http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/b/balloon-mortgage.asp, defines a balloon mortgage as fol-
lows: ‘‘A type of short-term mortgage,’’ which require borrowers to
‘‘make regular payments for a specific interval, then pay off the
remaining balance within a relatively short time. Some types of
balloon mortgages can be interest-only for 10 years, and the final
‘balloon’ payment to pay off the balance comes as one large
installment at the end of the term.’’
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to pay the loan and sometimes referred to as ‘‘liar loans’’),
which ultimately made up 9 % of all outstanding loans
(FCI Report 2011, p. 110).30 According to both Blinder
(2013, p. 70) and the FCI Report (2011, pp. 104–105),
about 70 % of subprime loans also employed adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs), such as 2/28s and 3/27s, which
provided the borrower with low ‘‘teaser’’ rates for 2 or
3 years and then adjusted periodically upward.31 Experi-
encing the euphoria of rising house prices, borrowers
believed they could refinance their subprime mortgages
and then settle into a mortgage that they would afford
(Blinder 2013, p. 71). Unfortunately, many of the subprime
mortgages, marketed to financially unsophisticated bor-
rowers, were simply ‘‘designed to default (pp. 70–71).’’
While the defaulted subprime mortgages alone were
insufficient to be a major cause of the financial crisis, those
defaults certainly contributed to the tremors leading to the
financial crisis (p. 71).
Mortgage brokers played a crucial role in pushing bor-
rowers into subprime loans. By 2007 more than half of all
subprime loans were being originated by mortgage brokers
rather than by banks (p. 59). Because brokers are paid fees by
the lender for generating the mortgage (often without the
borrower’s knowledge), they have no incentive to be con-
cerned about the loan’s performance (FCI Report 2011,
p. 90). Indeed, mortgage brokers’ compensation
scheme worked in the opposite direction, because their
compensation increased if they generated more mortgages
and they received a ‘‘yield spread premium’’ giving them
higher fees for more costly, riskier mortgages, often never
disclosed to the borrowers (pp. 7, 64, 90). Because many
mortgage borrowers are financially unsophisticated, they
were particularly ill equipped to understand the transaction,
compare terms of financial contracts, and shop around before
being pushed into the subprime mortgage terms (p. 90).32
Securitization Run Amok: Alchemy Pushing Risk
Downstream and Making Sausage with Tainted
Meat
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led the way. Possessing a
near monopoly on prime, fixed rate mortgages within their
loan limits, they purchased those mortgages from banks,
thrifts, and mortgage companies, assembled them into
mortgage pools, issued securities backed by the mortgage
pools (called mortgage-backed securities or MBS), and
implicitly guaranteed the payment of the mortgages
through their GSE status (pp. 38–39). Following their
example, investment banks would later bundle a wider
variety of loans into securities and sell them to investors,
who received investment returns funded by principal and
interest payments made by the debtors on the underlying
loans (pp. 42–43, 45). Those loans, however, extended
beyond prime mortgages to include subprime and adjus-
table-rate mortgages, equipment leases, credit card debt,
auto loans, student loans, and manufactured housing loans
(pp. 44–45). The benefits derived from assembling these
loan-backed investment packages were significant: lenders
moved the loans off their books, reducing the amount of
capital they were required to hold against losses and
improving their earnings; banks earned fees for assembling
the investment packages, raised funds from selling the
asset-backed securities generating new funds for additional
loans, and had the option of retaining parts of the securities
on their books as collateral for borrowing (p. 43). These
benefits aside, securitization also introduced an enormous
level of complexity into the securitization products, and
separated the lender from the risk of default, which was
transferred to investors downstream (p. 8).33
The earliest MBS created by Fannie and Freddie were
relatively simple mortgage pools containing a few thou-
sand mortgages (Blinder 2013, p. 72). The average value of
the mortgages multiplied by the number of mortgages
generated the par value for the security; the average
interest rate of the mortgages, less anticipated losses from
defaults, constituted the interest rate of the securities sold
to investors. Because the mortgages were pooled, the risk
from defaults was spread throughout the pool, much like
investors are advised to diversify their portfolios. Because
prime mortgages had very low default rates and were
implicitly guaranteed by the GSEs, investors believed the
MBS were safe investments. The risk profile of the security
they purchased was inherited directly from the underlying
mortgages in the mortgage pool, much like investors pur-
chasing mutual funds (p. 73).
In short order, things quickly became far more complex.
The mortgage pools, sometimes combined with other types
of loans, were divided into multiple tranches which would
absorb in ascending order the losses stemming from the
mortgage or loan defaults. The lowest tranches (sometimes
30 Blinder (2013) says, ‘‘It has been estimated that almost one third of
all subprime mortgages were either the low-doc or no-doc variety’’ (p.
70).
31 The 2/28 mortgage adjusts in the second year and applies higher
interest rates for the next 28 years. The 3/27 mortgage adjusts in the
third year and applies higher interest rates for the next 27 years.
32 ‘‘A study by two Federal reserve economists estimated that at least
38 % of borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages did not understand
how much their interests rates could reset at one time, and more than
half underestimated how high their rates could reach over the years’’
(FCI Report 2011, p. 90).
33 Because securitization generated huge fees, the phrase ‘‘I’ll be
gone, you’ll be gone’’ was coined. It captured the dealers’ recognition
that their huge upfront compensation justified the much larger, future
losses suffered by investors around the globe (FCI Report 2011, p. 8).
The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis: An Erosion of Ethics: A Case Study
123
called the residual or equity tranches) would absorb the
first wave of loan defaults (e.g., up to 8 % of the loan
pool); the middle or mezzanine tranches would be assigned
the next level of defaults (e.g., the next 2 % of the loan
pool); and the top level or senior tranche would be
responsible for losses above those absorbed by the lower
tranches. The equity tranches, having the highest level of
risk, paid the highest interest rates; the mezzanine tranches
paid lower interest rates; and the senior tranches, possess-
ing the least risk, paid the lowest interest rates (Blinder
2013 p. 75 and FCI Report 2011, p. 71). These tranches
permitted investors to choose the level of risk and rate of
return they were most comfortable with. Because loan
defaults on mortgages were quite low, no one expected
losses to reach the upper tranches. Further, in order to
compete with the implicit GSE guarantee that accompanied
Fannie and Freddie’s securities, the assemblers of mort-
gage and debt securities purchased credit default swaps
from financial institutions to guarantee payment of the
underlying securities and hired rating agencies (Moody,
Standard and Poor, and Fitch) to rate the various tranches.
Inevitably, the equity tranches received no rating; the
mezzanine tranches received lower investment grade rat-
ings (e.g., AA, A, BBB, BB), and the senior tranches
received the highest investment grades (e.g., AAA) (FCI
Report 2011, p. 73).
Because the lower rated MBS tranches could be hard to
sell to investors, Wall Street came up with an ingenious
solution: repackage the MBS with lower ratings into new
collateralized debt obligations (CDO), combine them with
other debt obligations, divide the new mixture into a new set
of tranches, and hire the rating agencies to rate the tranches.
Astoundingly, the rating firms ignored the prior ratings given
to the lowerMBS tranches, reapplied the same rating logic to
the new CDO (i.e., given the vast size of the debt pool and
attendant diversification benefits, defaults will not extend
into the upper tranches of the newly created CDO), and
stamped the senior tranches of the newCDOwith the highest
investment ranking (e.g., AAA) (pp. 128–129, 132). This
alchemy not only gave new life to mezzanine MBS but
triggered a frenzy among mortgage securitizers to obtain
mortgage loans for the new CDOs.
Between 2003 and 2007, as house prices rose 27 %
nationally and $4 trillion in mortgage-backed secu-
rities were created, Wall Street issued nearly $700
billion in CDOs that included mortgage-backed
securities as collateral. With ready buyers for their
own product, mortgage securitizers continued to
demand loans for their pools, and hundreds of billions
of dollars flooded the mortgage world. In effect, the
CDO became the engine that powered the mortgage
supply chain (pp. 128–129).
Indeed, everyone up and down the line had an interest in
keeping this engine humming: mortgage lenders and
brokers profited from increased volume; CDO managers
and underwriters who packaged and sold the securities and
rating agencies who evaluated them earned more fees;
guarantors sold more derivatives; and the executives of
these companies earned larger bonuses (pp. 130–132).
Better yet, the risk of default was moved downstream and
out of sight. Unfortunately, when the housing market went
south and defaults occurred in large numbers, the CDO
logic backfired and the financial crisis ensued (pp. 129,
130–132).34
At every link in this ‘‘daisy chain’’ the parties were less
knowledgeable about the soundness of the loans underlying
the securities, and, because securities were continually
reshuffled in ensuing and individualized editions of CDOs,
the securitization process became increasingly complex and
inscrutable (Blinder 2013, p. 76). Complexity and opacity
precluded comparison shopping, increased reliance on rat-
ing agency imprimaturs, temporarily prolonged the supply-
chain participants’ profit stream, and ultimately set the stage
for the ensuing collapse. Only a small percentage of mort-
gage defaults was required to ultimately trigger the col-
lapse, akin to mad cow disease: while the disease may infect
only a small portion of the beef on the market, the infection
is so frightening that consumers shun all beef. Traders
assumed the worst and tried to dump their now-unwanted
securities into falling markets. Prices plummeted and panic
ensued (pp. 78–79).
Overrated and Conflicted Rating Agencies
A key ingredient in the chain leading to the financial col-
lapse was the ‘‘flood of AAA ratings the credit rating
agencies showered on so many senior and super senior
mortgage-related securities (p. 79).’’ Sadly, rather than
serving as the safety rail preventing the financial system
from careening off the road, the credit rating agencies—
Moody’s, Standard and Poor, and Fitch—bungled the job
by applying deeply flawed models in gauging the safety of
the underlying mortgages and attached their coveted AAA
rating to MBS and CDO tranches like revelers throwing
beads in New Orleans Mardi Gras parades (FCI Report
2011, pp. 119, 120–121 and Blinder 2013, p. 79). Beside
34 See Jin (2013). The authors of this article report the results of their
survey of the members of large national association of financial
professionals, and concludes (1) that organizational core values
significantly affect corporate ethics, social responsibility, and finan-
cial performance and (2) the financial industry can move toward being
more ethical and socially responsible by adopting organic core values
(for example, democratic, open, trusting, enterprising, creative, and
simulating), and moving away from mechanistic values (e.g.,
structured, regulated, procedural, authoritarian, closed, and callous).
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the rating firms’ incompetence, the compensation system
itself contributed to the flawed ratings. The securitizers
hired and paid the rating agencies to evaluate the securi-
tizers’ securities (Blinder 2013, p. 80).35 Not wishing to
bite the hand that feeds it, the rating agency had an inherent
reason to please its customers. Moreover, the practice in
the rating business was to negotiate the desired ranking.
For example, the securitizer might ask the rating agency
what tweaking was needed to get the AAA rating. When
the securitizer followed the rating agency’s suggestion, the
agency was locked into giving the top rating. Further,
because there were only three SEC accredited rating
agencies (FCI Report 2011, p. 119), securitizers engaged in
‘‘ratings shopping,’’ pitting one rating agency against the
other and hiring the rating firm willing to give the highest
rating. Nor is there a downside to the rating agency’s
giving a flawed rating. Because security ratings are state-
ments of opinion, not fact, and because their agreements to
provide ratings disclaim liability for erroneous ratings,
rating agencies are typically not liable for their misstate-
ments (p. 120). Lastly, giant asset managers, regulators,
and market professionals too often relied exclusively on the
opinions of the rating agencies rather than undertaking
their own due diligence. This ‘‘abdication of duty’’ to look
deeper into the safety of the investments conferred an
undeserved mantle of ‘‘oracular authority’’ on the ratings
agencies (Blinder 2013, p. 81).36
Corrupting Compensation Systems
The structure of Wall Street compensation plans ‘‘created
perverse incentives for key employees to take excessive
risks with… other people’s money (p. 81).’’ Traders at
banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and other financial
companies were rewarded with hefty bonuses based on
transactions that made money, but faced no penalties for
transactions that failed (p. 82). Senior executives and key
employees received enormous compensation packages for
the financial success of their companies, and golden para-
chutes in the event of financial losses (p. 82).37 As noted
above, mortgage brokers improved their pay by enticing
people to sign mortgages, even if they had poor credit and
could not pay back the loan. They earned even bigger
commissions if they pushed the borrowers into dodgier
mortgages, but lost nothing if the loans defaulted. Stock
options encouraged employees to focus on short-term
profits, take larger risks, and employ greater leverage to
trigger jumps in the company’s stock price (FCI Report
2011, p. 63). Unfortunately, corporate directors, who
should fix and oversee compensation systems, were simply
‘‘asleep at the switch, with disastrous consequences’’ (FCI
Report 2011, pp. 213–214 and Blinder 2013, pp. 84,
213–214).38
Unprecedented Rescue Efforts
In early 2007, the housing bubble burst. Home prices fell.
Home sales declined. Mortgage delinquencies increased and
continued to do so as 2007 went on, particularly in subprime
adjustable-rate mortgages (FCI Report 2011, p. 213, 217,
221–222). Rating agencies downgraded their ratings of
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obliga-
tions. Alarmed investors sold, and sales prices plummeted.
By the summer of 2007, securitization of MBS and CDO
ceased and their market vanished (p. 214).39 Disruption
ensued as financial firms fled the commercial paper and repo
markets for safer harbors. Banks became unwilling to lend to
each other and scrambled to improve their own liquidity.
35 Professor Blinder (2013) analogizes this situation to students
paying their professors to grade the students’ work: ‘‘If I proposed
that my students pay me for grading their work, I’d be thought crazy,
corrupt or both. Yet this remains the accepted system for paying
rating agencies, even today’’ (p. 80).
36 According to the FCI Report (2011), securitizers negotiated away
their right to examine mortgages in the pools and frequently waived
their right to exclude mortgages that did not meet their guidelines.
When securitizers actually exercised their right to exclude mortgages
from the pool, loan originators followed the ‘‘three strikes, you’re out
rule,’’ by putting the loan into subsequent pools until it was kicked out
a third time (pp. 165–169).
37 Compensation packages for senior executives and key employees
soared in 2007. For example, the compensation of Lloyd Blankfein,
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CEO at Goldman Sachs was $468.5 million; Richard Fuld, CEO of
Lehman Brothers, $34 million; Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P. Morgan
Chase, $28 million. Year-end bonuses Wall Street firms paid workers
in New York was roughly $33 billion, and total compensation for the
major U.S. securities firms and banks approximated $137 billion (FCI
Report 2011, p. 63).
38 A reviewer of this paper insightfully suggested that an alternative
explanation for the lack of ethical behavior underlying the crisis
might be the personality based approaches involving greed, love of
money, and ruthless indifference to the fate of others on the part of the
corporate bankers involved in the debt crisis, and suggests that
examination of the following sources may be helpful starting point to
explore that line of research: Basham (2011), Boddy (2011),
Chambers et al. (2010), Cohan (2012), Jones (2013, 2014), Mesly
and Maziade (2013), Mulhern (2010), Spencer and Wargo (2010), and
Stout (2005).
39 Downgraded ratings caused huge losses. Investors, like banks,
pension funds, and insurance companies were forced to sell the MBS
and CDO, because they lost their investment grade status, and selling
into a declining market is disastrous. MBS and CDO held by financial
firms lost much of their value, and new securitizations lacked buyers.
Unable to sell, banks were forced to ‘‘mark-to-market’’ recognizing
losses on their securities. Assets in off-balance sheet SIVs, rendered
insolvent by the price decline, had to be brought back onto the
balance sheet and more losses had to be recognized. This reduced the
bank’s capital and increased its reserve requirements (FCI Report
2011, pp. 221–222).
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Institutions dependent on the commercial paper and repo
markets failed or would have to be rescued by the Federal
Reserve (p. 255).40
Bear Stearns was first. Experiencing runs by hedge fund
customers, derivatives counterparties, and repo lenders
(who loaned Bear Stearns over $100 billion, most of it
overnight), and possessing a large portfolio of illiquid
mortgage assets and unable to borrow from other banks
without government assistance, Bear Stearns notified the
SEC on Thursday evening, March 13, 2008, that it would
be ‘‘unable to operate normally on Friday’’ (p. 289).41 The
New York Fed made a $12.9 billion loan to Bear Stearns
through J.P. Morgan on Friday morning, March 14, 2008.
The markets viewed the loan as a sign of terminal weak-
ness. The rating agencies downgraded Bear Stearns’ rat-
ings. Bear Stearns’ stock plummeted and it was out of cash
by the end of the day. Over the next weekend, the Federal
Reserve, invoking its emergency powers, acquired $29.97
billion of Bear Stearns’ assets (mostly mortgage related)
and J.P. Morgan purchased Bear Stearns’ stock (FCI
Report 2011, pp. 289–290, 291 and Blinder 2011,
pp. 102–108). The principal reason for the decision to
rescue Bear Stearns is likely that it was ‘‘too intercon-
nected to fail’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 112). It was the prime
broker for hundreds of hedge funds; it was counterparty to
hundreds of thousands of derivatives transactions; it was
heavily involved in the repo financing market. If it failed,
all of those markets would have been severely disrupted
(pp. 112–113).
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were next. In July and
August 2008, they experienced liquidity squeezes when
they were unable to borrow against their own securities in
the repo market, and asked the Federal Reserve for help.
Suspecting their problems may have been deeper, the
Treasury Department developed a three-part legislative
plan to strengthen the GSEs: increasing their lines of credit,
injecting capital, and placing them under the supervision of
a new federal agency, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA). Congress approved these proposals when it passed
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Dis-
covering that the financial problems facing the GSEs were
worse than expected and that they were likely insolvent,
FHFA and Treasury agreed the GSEs had to be placed in
conservatorship and the boards of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac reluctantly voted to accept conservatorship on
September 7, 2008 (FCI Report 2011, pp. 316–320 and
Blinder 2013, p. 118), at significant cost to taxpayers (FCI
Report 2011, p. 322).42
Lehman Brothers was next. Lehman Brothers was a
poster child of high leverage and heavy reliance on low-
cost, short-term borrowing, and owed nearly $200 billion in
the repo markets. Lehman Brothers claimed it had $45
billion in ready liquidity, and its May 31, 2008, balance
sheet showed $639 billion in assets and $26 billion in
equity. However, Lehman Brothers’ assets included $21
billion in real estate and $72 billion in mortgage- and asset-
backed securities, and no one believed those assets were
worth that much. Indeed, marking them down by 30 %
would wipe out Lehman Brothers’ equity (Blinder 2013,
pp. 120–121 and FCI Report 2011, pp. 326–327). Various
suggestions and proposals to address Lehman Brothers
problems were considered over the summer (FCI Report
2011, pp. 328–329). By September 2008, Lehman’s situ-
ation had deteriorated further as investors became
increasingly concerned that Lehman Brothers could not
withstand the type of run that had taken down Bear Stearns.
Those concerns became reality, and a run ensued on Leh-
man Brothers (pp. 330–333). Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson and New York Fed President Timothy Geithner
arranged a weekend meeting on Saturday and Sunday,
September 13–14, 2008, among the heads of Wall Street
firms to work out a deal that would not, Paulson insisted,
involve public money. By Saturday night, the Wall Street
firms ultimately agreed to purchase Lehman Brothers
troubled real estate-related assets after which Lehman
Brothers would be acquired by Barclays Bank (pp.
333–335). On Sunday morning, however, the agreement
collapsed, when the parties could not agree whether Bar-
clays Bank or the New York Fed would provide a guar-
antee of Lehman’s obligations from the date of the
agreement until the transaction closed. When the agree-
ment unraveled, Lehman Brothers was doomed. Lehman
Brothers filed for bankruptcy on Monday morning,
40 Treasury Secretary Paulson provides his perspective on these
rescue efforts in an interesting Bloomberg Businessweek article. See
Paulson (2013). In the article, Secretary Paulson claims he lacked
authority to rescue Lehman Brothers by providing an infusion of
capital via a loan, a position with which Federal Reserve Chair
Bernanke agreed in testimony before the FDIC despite his earlier
claim that he believed the market was prepared for Lehman’s collapse
(FCI Report 2011, p. 340).
41 The run on Bear Stearns was accelerated by Goldman Sachs,
which temporarily refused to accept a novation removing Hayman
Capital Partners and installing Bear Stearns as the counterparty to a
relatively small derivative. Normally, this would have been a routine
transaction, and, when news of Goldman Sachs’ refusal to accept
Bear Stearns hit the street, the run on Bear Stearns gathered steam
(FCI Report 2011, pp. 287–288).
42 ‘‘[The Fair Housing Finance Agency] has estimated that costs [of
the bailouts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] through 2013 will range
from $221 to $363 billion. The Congressional Budget Office has
projected that the economic cost of the GSEs’ downfall, including the
total financial cost of government support as well as actual dollar
outlays, could reach $389 billion by 2019’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 119).
Placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship may have
sent a very bad message about the depths of the financial crisis,
because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac arguably held the better slices
of all of the MBS.
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September 15, 2008, at 1:45 am (Blinder 2013, p. 124 and
FCI Report 2011, pp. 335–339),43 and fervent arguments
have ensued ever since about whether the Federal Reserve
should have worked out a rescue plan for Lehman Brothers
as it had for Bear Stearns (Blinder 2013, pp. 125–127 and
FCI Report 2011, pp. 340–341). In any event, the conse-
quences of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy turned out to be
far more severe than anyone imagined and the financial
system began literally to fall apart (Blinder 2013, p. 127).44
One good thing did come out the weekend meeting. The
CEOs of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch agreed that
Bank of America would acquire (and thereby rescue)
Merrill Lynch. Although the takeover of Merrill Lynch
would later run into a few speed bumps, the merger was
completed on January 1, 2009 (p. 153).45
American International Group (AIG) was next in line. In
2004, AIG was the largest insurance company in the world
(measured by stock value) and a massive conglomerate
with $850 billion in assets, 116,000 employees in 130
countries, and 223 subsidiaries. AIG’s credit rating was the
highest possible rating: Aaa by Moody’s since 1986 and
AAA by Standard and Poor since 1983. One of only six
companies in the world to have the highest credit rating,
AIG could borrow more cheaply than its competitors and
bring an unusual level of credibility to the credit default
swap markets. Starting in 1998, one of its subsidiaries, AIG
Financial Products, became a major over-the-counter
derivatives dealer, eventually generating a portfolio of $2.7
trillion in notational amount. Credit default swaps consti-
tuted a significant portion of AIG’s derivatives business. Its
credit protection on assets, including MBS and CDOs,
grew from $20 billion in 2002 to $211 billion in 2005 and
$533 billion in 2007. AIG Financial Products’ regulator,
the Office of Thrift Supervision, did not require AIG to
establish a reserve in the case of a loss, and AIG Financial
Services was so confident there would be no realized
economic losses on the CDOs on which it provided pro-
tection, it failed to make any provisions for losses, a
colossal failure in risk management. Nor did AIG Financial
Services post any collateral when it wrote the contracts. It
did, however, agree to post collateral if the value of the
underlying securities dropped or if the rating agencies
downgraded AIG’s long-term debt ratings (FCI Report
2011, pp. 139–141 and Blinder 2013, pp. 131–133).
Disaster struck early in 2008. AIG’s auditors, Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers, not only discovered evidence AIG had
manipulated earnings, but also concluded that AIG had a
material weakness in internal controls, because AIG had
not developed a reliable methodology to estimate the
declining value of the securities on which it has written
credit protection (FCI Report 2011, pp. 141, 273). AIG was
forced to disclose this material weakness in an SEC filing
and acknowledged that it had understated its potential
losses related to the derivatives by $3.6 billion (pp.
271–273). The ratings agencies immediately announced
downgrades of AIG’s credit rating, triggering a crescendo
of calls for collateral from its counterparties, the most
aggressive of which was Goldman Sachs (FCI Report 2011,
pp. 141, 273–274 and Blinder 2013, pp. 133–135).46 Worse
news followed. At the end of February, AIG reported a net
loss of $5.29 billion stemming from $11.12 billion in
valuation losses related to the super-senior CDO credit
default swaps it had written and more than $2.6 billion in
losses related to purchases of mortgage-backed securities
by its securities lending business (FCI Report 2011,
pp. 271–273). These losses, in turn, triggered another bevy
of calls for additional collateral by AIG’s counterparties.
Over the ensuing months, AIG’s troubles mounted.
Demands for collateral by its credit default swap counter-
parties soared, and AIG struggled to keep pace. By
September, the calls had rocketed to $23.4 billion, of which
AIG had posted $18.9 billion (FCI Report 2011, p. 344 and
Blinder 2013, p. 235). The ratings agencies warned of
additional rating downgrades, which would produce an
43 Barclays later purchased much of Lehman’s U.S. banking business
out of bankruptcy. Green (2013).
44 According to the FCI Report (2011), ‘‘The inconsistency of federal
government decisions in not rescuing Lehman after having rescued
Bear Stearns and the GSEs, and immediately before rescuing AIG,
added to uncertainty and panic in the financial markets’’ (p. 343).
45 ‘‘Bank of America was soon suffering from buyer’s remorse. In
retrospect, it overpaid for a balance sheet and legal liabilities that
were worse than it realized’’ (Blinder 2013, p. 153). Merrill Lynch’s
projected after-tax losses were larger than expected, growing from $5
billion in early December to $12 billion in mid-December. This
prompted Ken Lewis, CEO of Bank of America, to contemplate using
an escape clause in the merger agreement. In January 2009, the
Treasury Department used $20 billion in TARP funds, discussed more
fully in the ‘‘Unprecedented Rescue Efforts’’ section, to purchase $20
billion in Bank of America preferred stock, and Treasury, Federal
Reserve and FDIC designated an asset pool of $118 billion to serve as
protective ‘‘ring fence’’ to provide liquidity and guarantee the
company’s solvency. On May 9, 2009, Bank of America asked to
exit the ring fence deal, explaining that the company had determined
Merrill Lynch’s losses would not exceed the first $10 billion, Bank of
America’s first-loss position (FCI Report 2011, pp. 383–385).
46 Goldman Sachs was far more aggressive than the other banks in
recognizing losses in marking its mortgage-backed securities to
market and insisted that AIG follow suit. Doing so would trigger a
substantial increase in the collateral AIG would have to post, and AIG
and Goldman Sachs continued to argue over Goldman’s marks and
the amount of collateral AIG was required to post. Their dispute
ultimately cost AIG tens of billions of dollars and triggered one of the
largest government bailouts in American history (FCI Report 2011,
pp. 233–234). Surprisingly, AIG senior executive officers later
claimed they were stunned by the initial collateral call to learn of
the collateral call provisions in the CDS issued by AIG, and the
managing director of AIG Financial Products claimed he directed
AIG to stop writing CDS 18 months earlier (FCI Report, 2011,
p. 266).
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estimated $10 billion in additional collateral calls; and
trigger liquidity puts AIG had written on commercial paper
would require it to come up with an additional $5 billion
(FCI Report 2011, pp. 344–345 and Blinder 2013, p. 136).
Its securities lending business had soured as well, because
the value of its posted securities had declined, reducing the
amount it could borrow, and the assets in which it had
invested the loan proceeds—largely mortgage-related—
lost significant value, triggering an additional $24 billion in
collateral calls from its securities lending counterparties.
Moreover, AIG had to come up with $1.4 billion to cover
its commercial paper loans by September 12, 2008, and
another $3.2 billion the following week (FCI Report 2011,
pp. 344–345). AIG was in deep trouble.
Unable to roll over its commercial paper or obtain repo
funding, AIG could neither borrow funds nor raise capital.
Caught in a trap without an escape button, AIG turned to
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for help (p. 347).
Letting AIG collapse was unthinkable. Doing so would
trigger a massive dislocation in the commercial paper
market, significantly increase the capital reserve require-
ments of European banks, which had lowered those
requirements by purchasing AIG credit default swaps, and
create massive disruption among the companies who pur-
chased AIG’s $2.7 trillion over-the-counter derivatives, $1
trillion of which was concentrated in just twelve large
counterparties (p. 348). Unable to work out a private sector
solution and invoking its emergency powers, the Federal
Reserve on Tuesday, September 16, 2008, agreed to loan
$85 billion to AIG to meet its immediate obligations. AIG
provided collateral in the form of the parent company’s
assets and those of its non-regulated subsidiaries, plus the
stock of those subsidiaries. Treasury would later add $49.1
billion of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds
(explained more fully below), and taxpayer funds com-
mitted to AIG would ultimately reach $182 billion (FCI
Report 2011, pp. 348–350 and Blinder 2013, pp. 136–137),
the worst public relations aspect of which was the public
outcry against the ‘‘embarrassingly large’’ bonuses paid to
four hundred AIG executives (Blinder 2013, 137–138).47
Within twenty-four hours, Lehman went bankrupt,
Merrill Lynch was taken over, and AIG was rescued. Panic
ensued. The Federal Reserve unsuccessfully scurried to
make cash available to banks to deter runs (FCI Report
2011, p. 371).48 Commercial paper and repo markets froze.
Unabated runs against banks, hedge funds, and money
market funds followed (FCI Report 2011, pp. 353–359 and
Blinder 2013, pp. 142–149). Seeking a different solution,
Treasury Secretary Paulson started seeking authority for
TARP funds from Congress.
When massive runs spread to Morgan Stanley and Gold-
man Sachs, the two large investment banks remaining, they
became the next parties in line. Believing they would fail, the
Federal Reserve on Sunday, September 21, 2008, accepted
their applications to become bank holding companies, a sug-
gestion the New York Federal Bank and FDIC had earlier
rejected for Lehman Brothers (FCI Report 2011, p. 328).
Morgan Stanley instantly converted its $39 billion industrial
loan company into a national bank subject to the supervision
of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Goldman
Sachs converted its $26 billion industrial loan company into a
state-chartered bank thatwas amember of theFederalReserve
System and subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve and
NewYork State. These conversions gaveMorgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs immediate emergency access to the Federal
Reserve’s discount window for terms of up to 90 days to
restore their liquidity, and, when Wall Street opened on
Monday morning, there were no large, independent invest-
ment banks remaining (FCI Report 2011, pp. 360–363 and
Blinder 2013, p. 152).
Washington Mutual lined up next. Depositors withdrew
$16.7 billion from their accounts and ‘‘WaMu’’ faced
imminent collapse. Moody’s downgraded WaMu’s senior
unsecured debt to junk status, and the Office of Thrift
Supervision concluded it was insolvent. The government
seized WaMu on September 25, 2008, appointing the FDIC
as receiver, and WaMu became the largest insured depos-
itory institution to fail in the U.S. history. J.P. Morgan paid
FDIC $1.9 billion to buy WaMu’s banking operations, and
WaMu’s parent, now lacking the thrift operations, declared
bankruptcy (FCI Report 2011, p. 365 and Blinder 2013,
pp. 155–157). Because the FDIC refused to protect
WaMu’s unsecured creditors under the ‘‘systemic risk’’
exception of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, panic spread to the unsecured
creditors of other struggling banks, including Wachovia,
the next institution to get in line (FCI Report 2011, p. 366).
Seeing what happened to WaMu, Wachovia depositors
accelerated significant withdrawals, lenders withdrew liq-
uidity support, and unsecured depositors and creditors using
their computers began a ‘‘silent’’ run on Wachovia (FCI
Report 2011, p. 367 and Blinder 2013, p. 157). Creditors47 Blinder (2013) contends that the most serious mistake in the AIG
bailout was the controversial decision to cover all of the losses of
AIG’s creditors, rather than giving them ‘‘a haircut,’’ thereby
seriously breaching the moral hazard principle (pp. 138–140).
48 ‘‘Ten days after the Lehman bankruptcy, the Fed had provided
nearly $300 billion to investment banks and commercial banks
through the [Primary Dealer Credit Facility] and the [Term Securities
Lending Facility].’’ The Fed used these programs to permit banks to
Footnote 48 continued
borrow money on advantageous terms by posting their assets of
questionable quality and extending the term of the loans (FCI Report
2011, p. 354 and Blinder 2013, pp. 296–297). The PDCF and TSLF
programs peaked at $483 and $156 billion, respectively (FCI Report
2011, p. 375).
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refused to roll over Wachovia’s short-term funding, includ-
ing commercial paper, and demandedWachovia pay roughly
half of its long-term debt. Although not contractually obli-
gated to do so, Wachovia feared its refusal to repay the loans
early would create insurmountable problems later. On
Saturday and Sunday, September 27 and 28, 2008, govern-
ment officials lined up Wells Fargo and Citigroup to bid on
Wachovia. Both company’s bids required the FDIC to cover
some losses, but Citigroup’s proposal appeared to provide
less exposure to the FDIC. On that basis, the FDIC approved
and publically announced Citigroup’s winning bid, permit-
ting Wachovia to open on Monday morning, September 29,
2008 (FCI Report 2011, pp. 367–369). As Wachovia and
Citigroup proceeded to work on their deal, Wells Fargo
sprang a surprise. On Thursday morning, October 2, 2008,
Wells Fargo offered to buy all of Wachovia stock for $7 per
share, seven times Citigroup’s bid, with no government
assistance (FCI Report 2011, p. 370 and Blinder 2013,
pp. 159–160). Wachovia’s board convened that afternoon
and accepted Wells Fargo’s offer unanimously. The Wells
Fargo deal was announced on Friday morning (p. 370).
These heroic rescue efforts would shortly be boosted
significantly by the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). TARP was a $700 billion program included in the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which
President Bush signed into law on October 3, 2008, and
which authorized the Treasury Department ‘‘to purchase
and insure certain types of troubled assets for the purposes
of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the
economy and financial system,’’ and to purchase ‘‘any
financial instrument that the Secretary… determines… is
necessary to promote financial market stability’’ (FCI
Report 2011, p. 372 and Blinder 2013, p. 192). While
Treasury Secretary Paulson promoted TARP as a vehicle
for purchasing toxic mortgage-related assets, he quickly
changed tactics and decided that the best way to reassure
the markets was to erase uncertainty about the solvency of
financial institutions by injecting capital into the major
financial institutions (FCI Report 2011, p. 272 and Blinder
2013, p. 192).49 This revised approach sidestepped the
difficult problems of identifying, establishing ownership,
appraising, auctioning, and purchasing (and forcing finan-
cial institutions to step forward and admit that they held)
toxic assets. On October 13, 2008, Treasury Secretary
Paulson strong-armed nine major financial institutions—
the four largest commercial bank holding companies (Bank
of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and Wells Fargo), the
three remaining large investment banks (Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley, which were now bank holding com-
panies, and Merrill Lynch, which Bank of America agreed
to acquire), and two important clearing and settlement
banks (BNY Mellon and State Street)—to accept capital
infusions in return for which the Treasury acquired senior
preferred stock50 paying a 5 % dividend. The amount of
capital infused into those financial institutions was signif-
icant: $25 billion each went to Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and
Wells Fargo; $15 billion went to Bank of America; $10
billion each went to Merrill, Morgan Stanley, and Gold-
man; $3 billion to BNY Mellon; and $2 billion to State
Street, for a total of $125 billion (FCI Report 2011,
pp. 373–374 and Blinder 2013, pp. 193–202). By infusing
this capital in the form of preferred stock, the banks’ equity
was substantially increased, a buffer was created for them
to absorb losses, the banks reduced their dangerously high
leverage, and the stability of the financial system was
increased. This made it safe to do business with banks,
which were cloaked in a de facto government guarantee.
Over the next few months, the last of President Bush’s
second term as President, the Treasury Department directed
TARP funds to specific financial institutions. It used $40 bil-
lion plus a $30 billion lending facility to prop upAIG a second
time. It provided $20 billion to shore up Citigroup, which lost
investor confidence after its failed bid forWachovia, incurred
huge losses on its structured investment vehicles, and flirted
with insolvency. It pledged $20 billion to Bank of America to
nudge the completion of its acquisition of Merrill Lynch. It
invested $181 billion in automobile manufacturers and their
finance companies: General Motors, GMAC, Chrysler, and
Chrysler Financial (FCI Report 2011, p. 375).
Despite ongoing disagreement about the ‘‘bait and
switch’’ application of TARP funds to infuse capital rather
than acquire toxic assets, the miraculous outcome is
‘‘TARP worked—probably better than anyone expected,’’
and in the end ‘‘cost the taxpayers almost nothing’’ (Blin-
der 2013, pp. 208–209). That certainly is not a bad out-
come for a couple of months of very hard work.
The Bush presidency came to an end. Barack Obama
became the 44th President on January 20, 2009. He
embarked on an ambitious and controversial economic
stimulus plan, and the Dodd–Frank Act, signed into law on
July 21, 2010, attempted to impose reforms on the financial
industry.
49 The scare tactics used to promote the passage of TARP may itself
have accelerated the crisis by expanding the panic from the financial
markets into the real economy causing consumer and business
confidence to plummet and grinding discretionary economic activity
to a halt.
50 Investopedia defines preferred stock as a ‘‘class of ownership in a
corporation that has a higher claim on its assets and earnings than
common stock. Preferred shares generally have a dividend that must
be paid out before dividends to common shareholders, and the shares
usually do not carry voting rights,’’ accessed at http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/p/preferredstock.asp.
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Major Ethical Issues
The 2007–2009 financial crisis ‘‘witnessed an erosion of
standards of responsibility and ethics… [that] stretched
from the ground level to the corporate suites’’ (FCI
Report 2011, p. xxii). The activities of the financial
institutions and regulatory agencies that contributed to
the financial crisis and government institutions that
employed unprecedented rescue strategies to drag the
financial crisis back from the brink of total global col-
lapse present major ethical questions.51 Those questions
include the following:
Mortgage Brokers
1. Determine whether the compensation paid to mortgage
brokers constitutes a conflict of interest with respect to
the individuals for whom the mortgage brokers facili-
tated the mortgages.
Because mortgage brokers’ compensation was higher
for originating subprime loans than conventional loans,
they frequently pushed borrowers into more costly and
risky mortgages, such as interest only, balloon and adjus-
table-rate loans, and failed to disclose either their com-
pensation differential to the borrowers or the differences in
risk posed by the subprime loans. Because it is unclear
whether the brokers generated subprime mortgages to gain
enhanced compensation or to advance interest of the bor-
rower, a conflict of interest exists.
2. How should the mortgage brokers have resolved the
conflict of interest, if any, with the individuals for
whom they sought mortgages with lenders?
In order to resolve the conflict of interest, the brokers
should either have removed themselves from the mort-
gage transaction or fully disclosed their enhanced finan-
cial interest in generating the subprime loans. Full
disclosure must cover not only the brokers’ enhanced
compensation but the enhanced risk accepted by the
borrower for which the broker is paid more, because many
mortgage borrowers locked into subprime loans were
financially unsophisticated and poorly equipped to
understand the transaction, compare terms, and shop
around.
Subprime Mortgage Lenders
1. Assess whether the marketing and promotion of sub-
prime mortgages ‘‘designed to default’’ to susceptible
consumers was ethical or unethical.
Because susceptible consumers lacked financial sophis-
tication and were lead to believe rising housing prices
would permit them to refinance their subprime mortgages
into ones they could afford, lenders who encouraged them
to commit to subprime loans without fully disclosing the
risks involved and properly assessing whether they could
successfully repay the loans acted unethically. Mortgage
brokers, who received higher compensation for originating
the riskier loans, acted deceptively in the absence of full
disclosure. Mortgage lenders, which earned higher interest
on subprime loans while they held them and higher com-
pensation upon selling the mortgage loan to banks securi-
tizing the mortgage loans, acted deceptively in the absence
of full disclosure. Further, both mortgage brokers and
mortgage lenders, who assigned the loans to banks secu-
ritizing the mortgages, lacked any incentive to be con-
cerned about the loan’s performance, because the loans
were passed downstream and became someone else’s
problem. The disastrous consequences of the financial
crisis to all those affected demonstrate that the practice of
marketing and promotion of subprime mortgages ‘‘de-
signed to default’’ was immoral under the ethical theory of
Act Utilitarianism. Likewise, marketing and promoting
subprime mortgages ‘‘designed to default’’ is not a rule of
conduct designed to produce the greatest good to those
affected, and hence is deemed immoral under the ethical
theory of Rule Utilitarianism. Finally, the failure to provide
full disclosure to the borrowers constitutes deception which
is deemed immoral under both Kant’s categorical impera-
tive and Rawls’ Equal Liberty principle.
2. Discuss whether lenders’ providing subprime mort-
gages to borrowers who were otherwise unable to
obtain prime mortgages and who agreed to the terms
of the subprime mortgage was ethical.
Providing subprime mortgages to borrowers who were
otherwise unable to obtain prime mortgages and who freely
agreed to the terms of the subprime mortgage was ethical,
because it provided the only avenue available to them to
acquire a home and was consistent with federal policy,
provided full disclosure of the risks of such loans was
given to the borrower and adequate assessment of the
buyers’ ability to repay the loan was made by the broker or
lender. This was certainly not the case in low-doc, no-doc,
interest only, and ‘‘pick-a-pay’’ loans.
51 Routledge recently published an excellent resource that addresses
these ethical questions. See Flynn (2012). In her book, Professor
Flynn explains what went wrong in the crisis and the role played by
the credit rating agencies, mortgage-backed and collateralized loan
securitizers, derivative dealers, AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
commercial and investment banks, the shadow banking industry, and
government regulators in causing the financial crisis. She next
examines the impact of the financial crisis on those directly affected
by the financial crisis, discusses what must be done to set things right
and insure such a crisis does not occur again, and addresses the ethical
implications of economic recovery efforts.
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Securitization of Mortgages
1. Assess whether banks’ securitization of mortgage loans
into investment securities with multiple tranches and
selling those securities to investors was ethical or
unethical.
There is certainly nothing morally wrong with assem-
bling complicated investment securities to investors, pro-
vided the investors are given sufficient and accurate
information to make an informed decision to invest in the
securities or to divest the securities. Indeed, mortgage-
backed securities played an important role in augmenting
the investment income of investors and commercial and
investment banks beyond that provided by Treasury bonds,
and, as implemented by Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, the
securitization of mortgages played a huge role in expand-
ing funds available to mortgage loan borrowers, because
lending banks could sell their mortgages and use the pro-
ceeds to fund additional mortgages, permitting more and
more families to acquire homes.
2. Determine whether the banks’ repackaging of lower
rated mortgage-backed securities into new collateral-
ized debt securities with investment grade ratings was
ethical or unethical.
The manner in which banks assembled and sold their
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt securi-
ties was incredibly complex. The securities were divided
into tranches each of which was assigned a different level
of risk. The securities were backed by credit default swaps,
and stamped with inflated ratings issued by Moody, Stan-
dard and Poor, and Fitch. When the securities did not sell,
they were repackaged into new collateralized debt obliga-
tions, assigned to new tranches, and given new, pristine
ratings by the rating firms. As subprime mortgages
increased, they too were tossed into the securities. This
complicated and ever changing mixture of tranches, credit
default swaps, inflated ratings, and prime and subprime
mortgages camouflaged the soundness of the loans under-
lying the securities. Because the securitization process had
become exceedingly complex and inscrutable, investors
were unable to understand what they were purchasing and
increasingly relied on the faulty rating agency imprimaturs.
These practices run counter to the moral obligations of
investment and commercial banks to provide accurate
information to investors so that they can make an informed
decision to invest or divest the securities. Providing accu-
rate information provides the greatest amount of good to
those affected by the issuance of complicated MBO and
CDO, and is ethical under Act Utilitarianism. Providing
accurate information is a rule of conduct that produces the
greatest amount of good to those affected by the issuance
of complicated MBO and CDO, and is ethical under Rule
Utilitarianism. Providing accurate information is deemed
moral, because it passes muster under Kant’s means-only
principle and Rawls’ Equal Liberty principle.
3. Assess whether or not the securitization of mortgages and
‘‘pushing the risk downstream’’ was ethical or unethical.
Permitting mortgage lenders to sell their mortgages
loans to other investors permits the mortgage lender to use
the proceeds of the sale to lend more money to borrowers
seeking to purchase homes. Employing government spon-
sored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
purchase prime mortgages and place them into mortgage
pools facilitates the process and advances the federal
government’s policy of increasing home ownership. While
the mortgage lender indeed ‘‘pushed the risk downstream,’’
the investment pools spread the risk of loss across the pool
and created sound investments, because prime mortgages
have a very low risk of default. In short, securitization of
mortgages serves an enormously beneficial function.
Nonetheless, the ever increasing complexity of the mort-
gage pools, which contained equity, mezzanine, and senior
tranches, which combined prime and subprime mortgages,
and which were secured by credit default swaps acquired in
over-the-counter derivatives markets from securitizers who
achieved unacceptable leverage ratios without any oversight
by government regulators, created a disastrous situation in
which only small percentage of mortgage defaults could
trigger a complete collapse of the financial system. Very
clearly the harms inflicted by the financial collapse, which
should have been foreseen, exceeded the benefits, making the
practice of inscrutable securitization of mortgages unethical
under the theory of act utilitarianism. Likewise, the practice
of creating and selling inscrutable mortgage and collateral-
ized debt obligations does not constitute a rule of conduct
which creates the greatest amount of good to those affected,
and violates rule utilitarianism. Because banks creating,
marketing, and selling the inscrutable mortgage and collat-
eralized debt obligations and dressing them up with flawed
securities ratings failed to disclose information needed by
investors to make an informed investment decision, those
banks flunk Kant’s ‘‘means only’’ principle and Rawls’ Equal
Liberty principle and ‘‘veil of ignorance’’ test, and hence
acted unethically.
Rating Firms
1. Assess the morality of the rating firms’ assignment of
investment ratings to the mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO)
assembled and sold by banks and subsequent down-
grading of those ratings.
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It is clear that the rating firms’ assignment of investment
ratings to the mortgage-backed and collateralized debt
obligations was incompetent. The rating firms employed
deeply flawed models in assessing the safety of the bonds
and looked the other way when mortgages they previously
rated low were repackaged into retranched bonds. As noted
in endnote 39, the rating firms’ subsequent downgrading of
securities ratings caused huge losses. Investors, like banks,
pension funds, and insurance companies, were forced to
sell the MBS and CDO, because they lost their investment
grade status, and selling into a declining market is disas-
trous. MBS and CDO held by financial firms lost much of
their value, and new securitizations lacked buyers. Unable
to sell, banks were forced to ‘‘mark-to-market’’ recognizing
losses on their securities. Assets in off-balance sheet
Structured Investment Vehicles, rendered insolvent by the
price decline, had to be brought back onto the balance sheet
and more losses had to be recognized. This reduced the
bank’s capital and increased its reserve requirements. Had
the ratings firms done their work properly, these losses
could have been avoided.
If the ratings firms were aware or should have been
aware of the financial debacle which followed their
assignment and subsequent downgrading of investment
grade ratings, the ratings firms clearly acted unethically
under all of the ethical theories. The bad consequences
outweighed the good consequences to those affected; the
incompetent assignment of investment grade ratings does
not constitute a rule of conduct that produces more good
than harm to those affected; and both Kant and Rawls
cannot abide deception.
2. Do you think holding the ratings firms liable for their
assignment of ratings to investment securities is ethical
or unethical?
It is tempting to think that holding the ratings firms
liable for their assignment of ratings on which investors
rely is ethical, because they would be compelled to act
more carefully in assessing the financial risk and appending
their coveted investment grade ratings. However, the rating
firms would likely be forced to raise their fees for their
investment ratings to offset their increased liability for
flawed ratings, thereby raising the price of the investment
and lowering the investment return. This scenario is anal-
ogous to the role of public accounting firms who audit the
financial statements of publicly traded companies. Their
audit fees are cheaper if their liability is limited to their
clients and known and identified users of the certified
financial statements. Their audit fees increase significantly
if they are held liable to foreseeable users of the certified
financial statements. Hence, in order to assess the morality
of making ratings firms liable for flawed investment rat-
ings, an assessment of the impact on ratings firms’ fees is
required. Regardless, the Dodd–Frank Act, discussed
below, has imposed liability for flawed ratings on the rat-
ings firms for knowing or reckless failure to conduct a
reasonable investigation in performing ratings services.
3. Determine whether the compensation arrangement
between the investment banks and ratings firms was
ethical or unethical.
The compensation arrangements between the investment
banks and ratings firms were problematic, because they
created a conflict of interest. The ratings firms might have
assigned the ratings because they were accurately com-
puted and properly advised investors who relied on them.
The ratings firms might have assigned the ratings, because
they feared the loss of their fees if they disappointed the
banks paying for the ratings and wanted to continue their
working relationship with the banks and the resulting
income flow. Blinder’s analogy is telling. He compares
banks’ compensation of rating firms to faculty members’
being paid by students to grade their submitted work.
While the fact credit rating agencies were paid by the
companies whose securities were rated was well known in
the industry, investors, who were unaware of those
arrangements and relied on those ratings without realizing
the existence of the conflict of interest, were likely
deceived. Hence, by failing to disclose fully the conflict of
interest to those investors, the investment banks and ratings
firms acted unethically.
Regulatory Agencies
1. Assuming the Federal Reserve had authority to man-
date that lenders issue only prime mortgages, do you
think the Federal Reserve acted unethically in
refraining from imposing such restrictions?
The 1994 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) directed the Federal Reserve to ban mortgage
loan practices it found to be unfair or deceptive, thereby
giving the Federal Reserve Bank authority to impose
restrictions on subprime mortgages. Nonetheless, subprime
mortgages played a crucial role in permitting low-income
families to acquire homes, an important public policy ini-
tiative of the Bush and Clinton administrations. Permitting
subprime mortgages to grow significantly (from 5 % of
mortgage origination in 1994 to 20 % of total originations
in 2005) supported that initiative. The Federal Reserve
reasonably concluded the amount of defaulted subprime
mortgages was insufficient by itself to trigger a financial
crisis. Hence, unless the Federal Reserve knew or should
have known defaults in subprime mortgages would trigger
the financial crisis, its refraining from requiring lenders
issue only prime mortgages cannot be said to be unethical.
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2. Do you think the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) acted unethically in failing to review, and require
adequate disclosures in, banks’ supplemental prospec-
tuses with respect to credit-granting or underwriting
criteria used in assembling the pooled loans?
As noted in endnote 22, the SEC contributed to the
financial crisis, because it permitted the issuance of more
than $2 trillion in non-GSE mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) and close to $700 billion of collateralized debt
obligations (CDO) with lax or no oversight. MBS were
issued through a ‘‘shelf registration,’’ a shell registration
statement to which a supplemental prospectus was added.
The supplemental prospectus contained a disclaimer of the
issuers’ obligation to comply with Regulation AB which
requires disclosure of credit-granting or underwriting criteria
used to assemble the pooled loans. The SEC failed to review
the supplemental prospectus. The CDOs were issued
through Rule 144A to qualified institutional buyers without
registration. In short, because the SEC permitted the issu-
ance of MBO and CDO investments, which violated or
sidestepped disclosure requirements that could have alerted
investors of the risks the MBO and CDO, the SEC acted
unethically. Had the SEC complied with its oversight
responsibilities, the financial crisis might have been averted,
thereby producing more net benefit to those affected. Like-
wise, permitting the issuance of securities with insufficient
disclosures certainly does not constitute a rule of conduct
which produces the greatest amount of good to those
affected. Finally, the failure to insure adequate disclosures
facilitates deception of investors, contrary to Kant’s means-
only principle and Rawls’ Equal Liberty theory.
3. Determine whether the decision of the Federal Reserve
and Treasury Department not to rescue Lehman
Brothers was ethical or unethical.
The decision of the Federal Reserve and Treasury
Department not to rescue Lehman Brothers, following its
rescue of Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, trig-
gered vast uncertainty and unbridled panic in the financial
markets which, in hindsight, arguably caused more harm to
financial institutions (ultimately requiring bailouts in tril-
lions) than the cost of rescuing Lehman Brothers (estimated
between $12 and $60 billion). Perhaps overplaying his hand
or simply seeking to escape scathing criticism for rescuing
undeserving financial behemoths, Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulsen insisted that the rescue be accomplished without
government funds. The resulting deal to have Wall Street
firms purchase Lehman’s toxic assets and sell the cleansed
investment bank to Barclay’s Bank almost worked, only to
collapse at the last moment. Not having a clear picture of
what the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department knew or
should have known about the consequences of Lehman’s
ensuing bankruptcy, it is difficult to assess the morality of
the decision not to rescue Lehman Brothers. If the Federal
Reserve and Treasury Department anticipated or should
have anticipated the true dimensions of the catastrophe that
followed, they acted unethically in failing to rescue Lehman
Brothers because more harm than good was created for those
affected. Likewise, implementing rescue efforts to avert a
greater harm constitutes a rule of conduct that likely pro-
duces the greatest net amount of good for those affected, and
failing to follow that rule of conduct would be deemed
immoral. Except for the principle of moral hazard discussed
below, Kant would likely agree that employing rescue tac-
tics to prevent greater financial harms constitutes an
acceptable universal practice, and hence is moral. Under
Rawls’ veil of ignorance theory, effecting financial rescue is
likely deemed a fair course of conduct if the parties do not
know what position they will occupy in the financial crisis,
and hence can be viewed as moral.
4. Assess whether the ‘‘moral hazard’’ principle was
sufficient justification for the Treasury Department to
refuse to rescue Lehman Brothers before it declared
bankruptcy.
The principle of ‘‘moral hazard’’ holds that govern-
ment’s rescue of financial institutions encourages them to
engage in risky transactions, because they anticipate being
bailed out by the government. To avoid the consequences
of moral hazard, the principle goes, the government should
make financial institutions absorb the loss to serve as a
lesson to others not to mimic such risky conduct.52 The
preceding rescue of Bear Stearns likely caused financial
institutions to believe they would be rescued if they found
themselves in financial difficulties, and permitting Lehman
Brothers to fail countered that belief. Unfortunately, Leh-
man Brothers’ bankruptcy shocked the financial markets,
and caused financial institutions to question the financial
health of their own counterparties. Lending halted, cash
was horded, and market paralysis and panic ensued. Given
the above noted disparity between the ultimate cost of
financial institution bailouts and the estimated cost of res-
cuing Lehman Brothers, the principle of moral hazard, at
least by hindsight, was an insufficient justification for let-
ting Lehman Brothers fail.
5. Assess whether or not the actions of the Federal
Reserve and Treasury Department to rescue Bear
Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, AIG, Goldman
52 This line of reasoning may be subject to a counterargument: by
rescuing the financial institutions, the common shareholders of the
rescued companies lost equity and senior management was usually
fired, results which in themselves may serve as a strong disincentive
to excessive risk. In other words, executives are encouraged not to
engage in excessive risk because they may in fact be rescued. The
difference, of course, is that in the case of rescue the financial
institutions live on. Unrescued financial institutions do not.
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Sachs and Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual,
Wachovia, and Citigroup was moral or immoral.
The actions of the Federal Reserve and Treasury
Department to rescue the above noted financial institutions
were likely ethical under Act Utilitarianism, because doing
so arguably produced the greatest net amount good to all
those affected by the rescue efforts. It was not simply the
direct financial fallout from letting those institutions collapse
that was avoided, but the likely collapse of global financial
markets. Employing approximately $700 billion in TARP
funds and $700 billion in President Obama’s ensuing
financial stimulus funds actually worked, avoided global
financial Armageddon, and was clearly worth the price. The
rule of conduct that likely produces the greatest amount of
good for those affected is to rescue financial institutions
when doing so avoids devastating global financial collapse.
Hence rescuing those financial institutions was likely ethical
under rule utilitarianism. The same conclusion is reached via
Kant’s categorical imperative and Rawls’ difference prin-
ciple. Rescuing the enumerated financial institutions likely
constitutes an effective universal practice which, given the
outcome of avoiding global financial collapse, financial
institutions can approve. While the identified financial
institutions were provided with an economic benefit not
provided to others, the disparate treatment is justified by the
critical needs of the financial institutions and, fortunately,
ultimately rescued the global financial markets rather than
further disrupting and collapsing them. Indeed, the failure to
implement those the rescues would have frozen all com-
merce and destroyed economies globally. Hence the finan-
cial rescue of the companies can be deemed moral under
Rawls’ difference principle.
6. Assess whether or not the Federal Reserve, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took adequate steps to
insure commercial and investment banks engaged in
sufficient risk management, and if not, whether their
failure to do so was ethical or unethical.
Under the ‘‘unwatchful’’ eyes of the bank regulators,
banks approved hundreds of billions of dollars in shameful
subprime mortgages and invested vast sums in dicey MBS
and CDO. The bank regulators did not seem to notice. They
were equally blind to the phenomenal growth of the sha-
dow banking system, featuring commercial paper and
short-term repo loans securitized by MBO and CDO
dressed up with credit default swaps. They looked the other
way while banks achieved dangerously high leverage that
triggered the domino chain of bank failures. They permit-
ted the banks to sell their mortgage loans to off-balance
sheet structured investment vehicles, which paid for the
mortgages with money borrowed in the commercial paper
market and enabled the banks to avoid increased reserve
requirements. They allowed banks’ investments in deriva-
tives to hedge against risks and further lower reserve
requirements. They stood idly by when the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 released the over-the-
counter derivatives market from any government regula-
tion. Despite clear warnings of the coming housing bubble,
reports expressing alarm about the risky lending practices
in subprime mortgages, and financial disruptions such as
the bankruptcy of Orange County, California, and the
collapse of Barings and the Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment hedge funds, the bank regulators shamefully took no
action to assess the adequacy of banks’ risk management
protocols. Given the danger signals flashing around them,
the bank regulators should have promptly addressed these
issues by shoring up risk management, cleaning up sub-
prime lending practices, requiring banks to lower their
leverage ratios, and upping reserve requirements. Their
failure to do so clearly produced far more harm than good
to those affected, and is deemed unethical under act utili-
tarianism. The rule of conduct for bank regulators that
likely produces the greatest amount of good to those
affected is to insure adequate risk management protocols
are followed by banks. By not following that rule, the bank
regulators acted unethically. Participants in the financial
system can likely agree that requiring bank regulators to
insure adequate risk management practices are followed
constitutes a beneficial universal practice, and hence is
moral under Kant’s categorical imperative. Rawls’ veil of
ignorance theory reaches the same conclusion: not know-
ing what position the participant might occupy in society, it
likely is an acceptable and fair practice to make banks
employ sufficient risk management practices.
American International Group (AIG)
1. Assess the morality of AIG’s issuance of credit default
swaps to guarantee the financial performance of the
MBS and CDO and its decision not to maintain
reserves in the event of default.
Even though AIG’s credit protections on assets, includ-
ing MBS and CDO, reached $533 billion in 2007, $79
billion of which was written in the over-the-counter credit
default swap (CDS) protection on super-senior tranches of
CDOs containing subprime mortgages, neither its regulator,
the Office of Thrift Management (OTM), nor AIG thought it
was necessary to provide any type of reserve for losses on
its credit default swaps (CDS), an enormous failure in risk
management. Notably, AIG was required to post collateral
on its credit default swaps if the value of the underlying
assets declined or if the credit agencies lowered AIG’s
credit ratings. Both conditions were fulfilled in 2008.
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Forced by its auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, to disclose it
had no reliable methodology to estimate movement in the
value of the securities on which it wrote its CDS, the ratings
agencies downgraded AIG’s credit rating, triggering a mas-
sive demand that AIG post significant collateral to secure its
CDS. Soon afterward, AIG began reporting substantial
declines in the value of MBS and CDO on which it had
written CDS, triggering an ensuing series of calls for
increased collateral. Declines in its securities lending busi-
ness exacerbated its situation. AIG simply could not keep up,
and, unable to borrow funds or raise capital, AIG turned to
and was rescued by the Federal Reserve.
Several features of this situation are surprising. First,
senior executive officers claimed they were stunned by the
initial collateral call to learn that collateral call provisions
existed in the CDS issued by AIG. Second, there is evidence
the managing director of AIG Financial Products directed
AIG Financial Products to stop writing CDS 18 months
before the financial crisis unfolded. This suggests there was
a lapse of internal controls over the operations of AIG
Financial Services. Third, the credulity of AIG Financial
Products executives and the OTM regulators to think there
was no need to post reserves for losses triggered by CDS
belies the financial success (indeed legend) previously
achieved by AIG, and vividly illustrates the difference
between prudent risk management and sheer recklessness.
Hence, AIG’s issuance of staggering amounts of credit
default swaps and failure to maintain reserves in the event of
the default of the underlying debts in MBS and CDO must
be deemed unethical. As a consequence of AIG’s actions,
significantly more harm than good was heaped on all those
affected, making the actions unethical. While supposedly
knowledgeable about risk management, AIG’s failure to
maintain reserves to cover defaults is decidedly not a ben-
eficial rule of conduct that produces more good than harm
for those affected, and hence is immoral under Rule Utili-
tarianism. Requiring financial institutions like AIG to
maintain safe reserve levels appears to be a laudable uni-
versal practice; failing to do so violates Kant’s categorical
imperative and is deemed immoral. When viewed from
behind the veil of ignorance, maintaining sufficient reserves
appears to be a practice that financial institutions would
deem fair and worthwhile; hence, AIG’s failure to do so can
be deemed immoral under Rawls’ theory of justice.
Commercial and Investment Banks
1. Determine whether it is moral or immoral for com-
mercial and investment banks to achieve such
extraordinary levels of leverage.
The commercial and investment banks achieved dan-
gerously high levels of leverage by borrowing heavily in the
commercial paper and short-term repo markets and selling
their mortgages to off-balance sheet structured investment
vehicles (SIV), as discussed more fully below. The debt to
equity ratios of the commercial banks at the time of the
financial crisis were eye popping: J.P Morgan (22:1); Wells
Fargo (17:1); Bank of America (27:1); Citigroup (32:1).
Notably these ratios did not factor in the debt the banks hid in
their SIV; if those debts were considered, the ratios would
have been substantially higher. Investment banks achieved
even higher debt to equity ratios: Goldman Sachs (32:1) and
Morgan Stanley (40:1). The investment banks were able to
do so because they had the added advantage of being per-
mitted to rely on their internal risk models in determining
capital requirements, rather than meeting the reserve
requirements of the commercial bank regulators.53
Having such high debt to equity ratios was an enor-
mously risky financial strategy, which daily required the
banks to return to the capital markets to renew their loans
and face the danger that a refusal to roll over its short-term
borrowing could trigger a run. The major problem with
such high leverage ratios is that the banks had little or no
cushion when the financial crisis unfolded. Moreover,
because these were private transactions, only the parties to
the loan renewal were aware of debt, causing other banks
to become suspicious about the financial condition of
competitors. This contributed to the collapse of the shadow
bank and derivatives markets, because no bank was willing
to lend money to other banks. The financial markets froze
and the government had to intervene.
That the banks achieved such high debt to equity ratios
was likely unethical. Under the theory of act utilitarianism,
the banks’ collective and significantly high leverage was a
substantial contributing cause to the financial crisis, and
certainly produced more overall harm than good. The rule
of conduct that likely produces the greatest amount of good
to those affected is that banks should maintain reasonable
levels of leverage to protect investors and customers. By
failing to follow that rule, the highly leveraged banks acted
unethically. Having banks maintain reasonable levels of
leverage likely constitutes an acceptable universal practice,
because financial institutions would be operating in a much
safer environment, and hence would be deemed ethical
under Kant’s categorical imperative. Likewise, not know-
ing what position the banks might occupy in the financial
53 Because of the vast differences in risk that banking institutions
take, each bank is permitted to tailor its internal risk management
program to its needs and circumstances. Risk management programs
involve several crucial steps: identifying risk, measuring risk,
monitoring risk, and controlling risk. Notably, however, because
each bank creates and tailors its own risk management program,
comparisons across financial institutions and employment of common
rules are precluded, essentially permitting each bank to evaluate itself,
perhaps akin to permitting students to grade their own work.
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sector, the banks likely would agree that maintaining
adequate debt to equity ratios would be a fair rule to fol-
low. Hence maintaining reasonable leverage would be
deemed ethical under Rawls’ veil of ignorance theory.
2. Determine whether it is moral or immoral for com-
mercial and investment banks to utilize structured
investment vehicles to remove their mortgage-related
assets and liabilities from their financial statements?
Banks sold their mortgage loans to their structured
investment vehicles (SIV); the SIV borrowed money in the
commercial paper market to pay for the mortgages; and the
banks used the sales proceeds to make more loans. Because
their balance sheet did not change, banks avoided additional
reserve requirements; because the banks did not have to
report the loans on their balance sheet, the significant debt
incurred by the SIV was hidden from view. The lack of
transparency in the shadow banking and derivatives markets,
the steps banks took to hide their high leverage before the
end of their accounting reporting period, and the bank’s
concealment of debt in their SIV constitute deception, and
hence would be deemed unethical under Kant’s means-only
principle and Rawls’ Equal Liberty principle. Likewise, as
noted above, camouflaging the banks’ level of debt was a
substantial cause of the financial crisis, caused more harm
than good to those affected, and constitutes a lousy universal
practice. Hence banks’ hiding debt in SIV can be deemed
immoral under both Act and Rule Utilitarianism.
3. Determine whether it is moral or immoral to employ
derivatives to hedge risk and enhance leverage.
Properly employed derivatives such as options and
futures contracts are essential tools to hedge financial risk.
An option gives the purchaser the right to buy an asset at a
specified price (the ‘‘striking price’’) during the life of the
option. If the price of the underlying asset goes up, the
purchaser of the option can exercise the option and realize
as profit the difference between the market price of the
asset and the striking price in the option. If the price of the
underlying asset goes down, the purchaser of the option can
buy the asset in the market at the lower price and let the
option expire, effectively purchasing the asset at the price
that was originally satisfactory to the option’s purchaser.
A futures contract requires the buyer to purchase and the
seller to sell an asset at a specified price at a designated
future date. The difference between the market price of the
asset and the striking price is noted daily (‘‘marked to
market’’). If the price of the underlying asset goes up, the
gain is attributed to the buyer’s account and the loss to the
seller’s account. If the price of the underlying asset goes
down, the loss is attributed to the buyer’s account and the
gain to the seller’s account. At the end of the contract term
the account is settled and closed. The asset underlying the
futures contract is usually never actually delivered. Rather
the purchaser buys the asset at the current market price. If
the price of the asset increased during the term of the futures
contract, the gain made by the purchaser offsets the
increased price. If the price of the asset decreased during the
term of the futures contract, the purchaser buys the asset at
the lower price, but the loss realized on the futures contract
effectively permits the buyer to purchase the asset at the
price that was originally acceptable. The markets in which
options and futures contracts are traded provide an invalu-
able tool to the marketplace: they permit investors hedge
risk on price movements of the underlying assets, and pro-
vide valuable information about the direction in which the
prices of the assets are likely to move in the future.
Futures contracts are highly leveraged, because the
investor has control over a large cash amount of the
commodity but is only required to put up a relatively small
amount of capital. At the time the futures contract is ini-
tiated, the commodity exchange requires the investor to
deposit a minimum amount of money (perhaps 5–10 %) of
the futures contract. This deposit (called ‘‘the initial mar-
gin’’) is increased or decreased on a daily basis depending
on the movement of the price of the underlying commod-
ity. If the margin drops below a designated amount (called
the maintenance margin), the broker will ask the investor to
make an additional deposit into the account to bring the
account at least up to the initial margin. This request is
called a margin call. Because the futures contract is highly
leveraged, the investor can realize significant gains (or
losses) on substantial amounts of commodities with com-
paratively small levels of capital. For example, if the
futures contract enables the investor to acquire $250,000 of
a commodity on an initial margin of $12,500, a 6 %
increase in the price of the commodity would provide the
investor with a profit of $15,000 (or 150 % of the initial
margin). If the price of the commodity decreased by 6 %,
however, the investor would realize a loss of $15,000
(150 % of the initial margin), causing the investor to come
up with $5,000 in addition to the original margin.
The fact that derivatives markets enable investors to hedge
losses and use significant leverage is neither moral nor
immoral. Regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the U.S. derivatives markets provide essential
transparency into worldwide forces affecting prices of com-
modities and permit hedgers and speculators achieve their
investment objectives. In contrast, the manner in which the
banks engaged in derivatives transactions in over-the-counter
derivatives markets was secretive, and fueled suspicion and
fear about the financial condition of the parties when the
defaults in MBO and CDO became known. The wretched
stew of unwatchful regulators, unbridled mortgage-lending
standards, subprime mortgages, and unregulated shadow
banking and derivatives transactions caused the financial
system to freeze and triggered a horrendous financial crisis.
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OTC Derivatives Market
1. Assess whether passage of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, which exempted the over-
the-counter derivatives market from any government
regulation, constitutes ethical government policy.
As noted in endnote 17, the Commodity Futures Mod-
ernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) deregulated the over-the-
counter derivatives market and eliminated oversight by the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The
law also repealed a ban on single stock futures transactions,
and preempted application of state laws that otherwise
could have made over-the-counter derivatives transactions
illegal. In short, the CFMA effectively immunized over-
the-counter derivatives from all regulation or oversight. If
the over-the-counter derivatives market were subject to the
regulation of CFTC, significantly more transparency would
have been provided to the derivatives transactions, to the
massive amounts of derivatives issued and purchased by
the banks, and to the significant level of leverage they
provided. If the players in the shadow banking system—
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, commercial and investment
bank securitizers, bank SIVs, hedge funds, private equity
funds, asset managers and mutual, pension and other
investment funds—had greater insight in the huge amounts
of derivatives traded and CDS issued, financial sanity and
safeguards could have been instituted earlier and the
financial crisis avoided. If so, enacting CFMA into law
likely produced more harm than good to those affected, and
did not constitute a rule of conduct that produced more
good than harm to those affected, and hence is deemed
unethical under Act and Rule Utilitarianism. Further,
CFMA permitted the parties to the derivatives to shroud the
transactions in secrecy and hide the massive financial risk
assumed by the shadow banking participants, especially the
GSEs, the commercial and investment banks, and AIG.
Likewise, the lack of transparency and sheer complexity of
the over-the-counter derivatives permitted by CFMA can-
not survive the deception tests of Kant’s categorical
imperative and Rawls’ Equal Liberty theory. Enacting
CFMA, then, can be considered unethical.
2. Discuss the ethics of the ‘‘self-correcting market’’
philosophy which eschews prescriptive government
regulation of the derivatives market and imposes the
risk of loss on investors as a regulatory scheme?
Banking regulators depended on the bank’s internal risk
management systems to assess the financial soundness of
the institution and, rather than duplicating the risk man-
agement tests, provided feedback on the quality of its risk
management systems. This approach assumed the financial
institution appreciated the self-correcting nature of markets
and, acting in its own self-interest, would not inflict
financial harm on itself by engaging in overly risky trans-
actions and suffering the consequences. This deference to
self-correcting markets inhibited regulators from imposing
prescriptive restrictions on banks, and permitted the regu-
lators to take a ‘‘wait and see’’ approach as the news of
troubling mortgage practices became more persistent. Once
the regulators became aware that the mortgage problem
was real, they drafted non-binding guidance statements on
non-traditional mortgages, and asked the banks to consider
the buyer’s ability to pay the loan when higher rates of
interest or balloon payments kicked in and to use ‘‘no doc’’
and ‘‘low doc’’ loans cautiously. The advisory approach
employed by the regulators opened the door to delaying
tactics on the part of the banks, and postponed the imple-
mentation of effective regulation to clean up the mortgage
writing practices until it was too late. Following the ‘‘self-
correcting market’’ ideology is immoral under Act Utili-
tarianism, because doing so was a substantial cause of the
financial crisis and inflicted more harm than good on those
affected. The rule of conduct that likely produces the
greatest amount of good to those affected is to take prompt
and clear regulatory action to cure the mortgage market
problem, rather than waiting for the market to inflict the
self-correction on the financial institutions. Hence not
following that rule can be considered unethical. Taking
prompt and clear corrective regulatory action likely might
not be a practice financial institutions like, but probably
constitutes a practice that is best for the financial markets
and hence can be imposed on all financial institutions under
Kant’s categorical imperative. Taking prompt and clear
corrective regulatory action is likely an acceptable practice
when viewed from behind the veil of ignorance, and hence
would be deemed moral under Rawls’ justice principle.
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (‘‘the Dodd–Frank Act’’) was signed into law to in
response to the financial crisis and for the purposes of cor-
recting the egregious conduct of major financial institutions
that caused the financial crisis, mandating that taxpayer
money never be used in the future to bail out financial
institutions, and curbing the emergency powers of the Fed-
eral Reserve utilized to rescue and resuscitate financial
institutions and end the financial crisis. Just as understanding
what happened in the Enron scandal explains the major
provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley act, so too understanding
what happened in the 2007–2009 financial crisis explains the
major provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act.
The Dodd–Frank Act is a lengthy (848 pages) and
complicated piece of legislation which directs regulatory
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agencies to issue a vast series of regulations, creates
additional bureaucracies, and imposes a huge cost on
financial institutions to comply with its myriad require-
ments. Several features of the Dodd–Frank Act deserve
attention.
Financial Stability Oversight Council
TheDodd–FrankAct creates the Financial StabilityOversight
Council (FSOC), whose role is to collect and analyze data to
identify and respond to emerging risks throughout the finan-
cial system. Voting members of the FSOC are the Treasury
Department, Federal ReserveBoard, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Commodities Futures Trading Commission,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency,
National Credit Union Administration, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, and an independent appointee with insur-
ance expertise.Thefivenon-votingmembers includeOfficeof
the Federal Register and state banking, insurance and securi-
ties regulators. FSOC will also recommend stricter rules for
capital, liquidity, and riskmanagement; approvemanagement
of non-bank financial companies by the Federal Reserve if
they pose a threat to the U.S. financial stability; approve the
breakup of large companies posing a threat to the U.S.
financial stability; and establish a floor for capital and enforce
a 15:1 leverage requirement to mitigate grave threats to the
U.S. financial system.
Terminating ‘‘Too Big to Fail’’ Bailouts
The Dodd–Frank Act prohibits the use of taxpayer funded
bailouts and liquidations; implements the ‘‘Volker Rule’’
requiring regulators to prohibit proprietary trading, invest-
ment in and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity
funds and restricting relationships with hedge funds;
requires ‘‘large, complex financial companies’’ to periodi-
cally update and submit plans for their rapid and orderly
shutdown should the company go under; creates an orderly
liquidation mechanism for FDIC to unwind failing financial
companies monitored by the Treasury Department, FDIC
and the Federal Reserve; prohibits the Federal Reserve from
engaging in emergency lending transactions without the
approval of the Secretary of Treasury; and bars the Federal
Reserve from emergency lending to an individual entity.
Creating Transparency and Accountability
for Derivatives
The Dodd–Frank Act authorizes the Securities Exchange
Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading Com-
mission to regulate over-the-counter derivatives trades and
provide oversight of excessive risk-taking. The Dodd–
Frank Act also requires derivatives transactions to be
executed on a central clearing exchange so that (1) there is
control over which derivative contracts are cleared, (2) data
can be collected on derivative contracts providing greater
transparency to the derivatives market, (3) reasonable
capital and margin requirements on derivatives dealers and
swap participants can be enforced, and (4) registered swap
dealers and major swap participants follow a code of
conduct when advising a swap entity.
Enhanced Compensation Oversight for Financial
Industry
The Dodd–Frank Act requires federal financial regulators
to issue and enforce joint compensation rules (focused on
incentive compensation) specifically applicable to financial
institutions with a Federal regulator.
Mortgage Reform
The Dodd–Frank act requires lending institutions to ensure
borrowers can repay their loans; prohibits financial incen-
tives and bonuses (such as ‘‘yield spread premiums’’) for
steering borrowers into more costly subprime loans; imposes
penalties up to 3 years of interest payments, liability for
damages, and attorney fees on lenders and mortgage brokers
who fail to comply with the new mortgage standards;
requires disclosure to borrowers of the maximum a borrower
could pay on a variable rate mortgage and a warning their
payments will vary based on interest rate changes; and
establishes an Office of Housing Counseling within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to boost
homeownership and rental housing counseling.
Registration of Hedge Funds
The Dodd–Frank act requires hedge funds and private equity
advisors to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission as investment advisors and to provide data
about their trades and portfolios to permit assessment of
systemic risk. The Dodd–Frank Act also raises the threshold
for federal regulation of investment advisors from $30
million to $100 million, thereby increasing the number of
advisors subject to proven and effective state supervision
and permitting the Securities and Exchange Commission to
focus its resources on newly registered hedge funds.
Credit Rating Agencies
The Dodd–Frank Act creates the Office of Credit Ratings
within the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to
examine and issue a report on the Nationally Recognized
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Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) at least once a
year. The Dodd–Frank Act also requires NRSROs to (1)
disclose their ratings methodologies, their use of third par-
ties in due diligence, and their ratings track record, and (2)
consider credible, independent information in their ratings
that comes to their attention from a source other than the
organization being rated. The Dodd–Frank Act also requires
the NRSRO to conduct a one-year look-back review if an
NRSRO employee accepts employment with the obligor or
underwriter of a security rated by the NRSRO, subjects
NRSROs to liability to investors for their knowing or reck-
less failure to conduct a reasonable investigation in per-
forming ratings services, and directs the Securities and
Exchange Commission to create a mechanism to prevent
issuers of asset backed securities from picking the agency
they think will provide the highest rating.
Skin in the Securitization Game
Companies that sell products like mortgage-backed securities
are required to disclose more information about the underly-
ing assets, to analyze the quality of the underlying assets, and
to retain at least 5 % of the credit risk unless the underlying
loans meet standards that reduce riskiness, and thereby suffer
losses along with the purchasers of the securities.
The above noted summary of the major provisions of the
Dodd–Frank Act can be reinforced by dividing students
into eight teams, and asking each team to identify the
actions or transactions discussed in the case study that
likely lead to its inclusion in the Dodd–Frank Act.
Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, the purpose of the case study is
twofold: (1) to enhance students’ understanding of the
2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States, and (2) to
provide a convenient tool that assists faculty members to
address the 2007–2009 financial crisis in their classes and to
enhance the student’s understanding of ethics. Toward
those ends, the case study examines five crucial dimensions
of the 2007–2009 financial crisis: (1) the devastating effects
of the financial crisis on the U.S. economy, (2) the causes of
the financial crisis and panic, (3) the extraordinary rescue
efforts undertaken to stem the financial freefall triggered by
the crisis, (4) the ethical implications of the parties
involved, and (5) the major provisions of the Dodd–Frank
Act enacted in response to the financial crisis. The heart of
the case study is the examination of the morality of the
actions of the principal players who triggered and amelio-
rated the financial crisis. Notably, these questions address
the actions of financial companies, their executives and
government regulatory agencies. By posing questions about
their actions and suggesting answers to those questions, the
case study hopefully will assist faculty members to include
the 2007–2009 financial crisis in their courses and to
enhance their students understanding of ethical principles.
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